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Introduction  
Growing and widespread interest in sustainability issues has increased the tendency of 
companies to engage in disclosure related to their environmental and social impact. The number 
of corporate sustainability reports published each year is constantly increasing and, in parallel, 
it is growing the interest of financial capital provides and of regulators over the practice. 
However, sustainability reports have been criticised for their lack of completeness and 
credibility and for their inability to contribute to the goal of sustainable development. In this 
context, different reporting practices has emerged to enhance the credibility of sustainability 
reporting, and external assurance is one of these practices. Subjecting disclosure of 
sustainability information to a process similar to the one deployed when auditing a financial 
statement could be an effective technique for overcoming the criticisms addressed to 
sustainability reports, enhancing disclosure quality and the credibility of information reported. 
From a legitimacy perspective, the adoption of voluntary assurance may strengthen and 
legitimize company’s behaviour and its right to operate. However, the practice of external 
assurance is not exempt from criticism. Mainly criticisms flourished in the academic literature 
refer to the absence of stakeholder participation during the assurance process, the lack of 
independence of the assurance provider, the lack of specific regulation and the existence of a 
financial interest in performing the engagement. Therefore, there is an open debate concerning 
the credibility and usefulness of assurance. Concerns have been raised as to whether adopting 
assurance practice is simply designed to improve corporate image or whether there is also an 
association with enhanced disclosure quality. Drawing on Legitimacy Theory, the first scenario 
would suggest a symbolic approach in adopting assurance practice, while an enhanced 
disclosure quality could represent a substantive use of the practice. Within this debate, a limited 
number of studies have focused on the relation between assurance and disclosure quality 
providing mixed results. Therefore, I believed it could be of relevant interest digging deeper 
into this topic. My research analyses whether disclosure quality is related with the choice of 
having external assurance. The aim is to investigate whether companies that decide to assure 
their sustainability report show also a higher commitment toward accountability disclosing 
more and better information. Moreover, this study also examines whether differences in the 
quality of disclosure can be reconciled with the choice of different types of assurance provider. 
I decided to focus the analysis on companies belonging to two environmentally sensitive 
industries (Power & Heat and Oil & Gas) and to limit the scope of my analysis to the 
environmental dimension of sustainability reporting. Companies have been selected from the 
European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) Company Database. I believed that, in the actual 
context of high concerns for climate changes and emission reduction, framing an analysis of 
environmental disclosure on emission intensive companies could be interesting and meaningful.  
I decided to limit the research to European companies as I believed investigating sustainability 
reporting related practice in Europe is particularly timely, considering that European companies 
will be bound form the financial year 2017 onward by the directive regarding disclosure of non-
financial information which also include sustainability disclosure.  
The disclosure quality has been assessed using a multidimensional framework which includes 
quantity, type of information and managerial orientation. These three dimensions have been 
used moving from the insight that quantity is not a sound proxy for quality.  
The work is organized in four chapter. The following two chapters provide a literature review: 
the former focuses on Sustainability Reporting, the latter focuses on the practice of Assurance 
and ends with the identification of a research gap and the definition of the research questions. 
Chapter three is devoted to research methods for conducting the empirical analysis and chapter 
four presents and discusses the results obtained. 
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1. Sustainability Reporting 
Sustainability Reporting is defined as “an organization’s practice of reporting publicly on its 
economic, environmental, and/or social impacts, and hence its contributions – positive or 
negative – towards the goal of sustainable development”. (GRI Standard, 2016, p.3) 
Sustainability reporting answers to the growing demand of information that goes beyond 
financial data. According to the Federation of European Accountants “users of financial reports 
are looking for more information about the value creation process of an undertaking as well as 
information as to how it interacts with the world around it.” (FEE, 2016, p.5). This information 
is aimed at presenting the sustainability of the business model of a company and how it is able 
to meet stakeholder expectations.  
The most common labels used for that kind of disclosure includes Sustainability Reporting 
(SR), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting and ESG (environmental, social, 
governmental) Reporting. Typically, it involves disclosure of economic, social and 
environmental performance. The subdivision of sustainability information into these three 
categories derives from the concept of Triple Bottom Line defined by Elkington in 1994. The 
insight of Elkington was to sort corporate performance into economic, social and 
environmental, thus adding to the traditional bottom line representing profit also an account for 
people and planet. In this work, I have decided to narrow the scope of attention to the 
environmental dimension. Accordingly, the theoretical part of the thesis will provide, where 
possible, more reference to environmental dimension of disclosure.  
Sustainability reporting has become the standard for large companies. The most recent KPMG 
Survey (2015) shows that 92 per cent of the Global Fortune 250 (the first half of Fortune’s 
Global List) report on their CSR activities. These reports attract the attention of investors, 
regulators and customers and are becoming more and more relevant as driver for investment 
decision (EY, 2017). According to GRI, in the future reporting content and format will have to 
be more and more tailored to the need of encouraging investors to make sustainable investment 
decisions (GRI, 2015). The interest of governments in the topic is clearly reflected in the 
emerging regulatory requirements aimed at disciplining Sustainability Reporting practice. 
Being under the lens of financial capital provides and of regulators, the topic of Sustainability 
Reporting seems to be of increasing interest in the worldwide scenario. However, this growing 
interest is accompanied by criticisms. Doubts have been raised as to whether such disclosure 
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do not improve social and environmental impacts but rather serves to protect the organization 
from external pressure (Cho and Patten, 2007). Sustainable reports have been criticised for their 
lack of completeness and credibility (Adams and Evans, 2004) and for their inability to 
contribute to the sustaining of the Earth’s ecology (Milne and Gray, 2012). Not only they have 
been addressed the criticisms of incompleteness and ineffectiveness, but also of serving as a 
“corporate veil” that provides a new face to the outside world, while protecting the organization 
from external view (Hopwood, 2009). In this context, external assurance can be framed as a 
practice that have been deployed to enhance the credibility of sustainability reporting.  
In this chapter I will give a theoretical introduction of the practice of sustainability reporting. 
In the first paragraph, I will present the evolutionary trend in the practice, considering both 
regulatory context and voluntary diffusion of the practice. In the second paragraph, I will 
introduce the major reference existing as reporting guidelines, which I believe is essential in 
order to set the basis for analysing sustainability reports. In the last paragraph, I will present 
theories that have been tied to CSR, with a focus on Legitimacy Theory, which seems to be the 
most suitable when dealing with the topic of external assurance.  
 
1.1 Historical evolution of the phenomenon 
According to Elkington, since 1960, three waves of public pressure have contributed in shaping 
the environmental agenda (Elkington, 2004). The first wave started to raise awareness of the 
fact that environmental impact needs to be limited. Accordingly, companies started to provide 
information on their social and environmental activities (Fika, 2012). A second “green wave” 
began in 1987 when, for the first time, the concept of sustainable development was defined in 
the publication “Our Common Future” by the United Nations World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED). In this context, sustainable development was defined 
as a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (WECD, 1987). Since then the concept started to attract 
public attention. A third wave emerged in the 90s with the beginning of Globalization. In those 
years, interest toward environmental reporting started to keep pace. It is in this period that the 
already mentioned concept of Triple Bottom Line emerged, giving rise to the practice of 
reporting that integrate the social and environmental dimension with the economic one, based 
on the three pillars of sustainability. Moreover, the practice of publishing a stand-alone report 
dedicated to sustainability issues become mainstream (Fika, 2012). In 2001 the European 
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Commission, acknowledging that the debate on the role of business in achieving sustainable 
development was starting to gain importance on the global stage, published a Green Paper 
aimed at promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibilities. The Green 
Paper defined CRS as “A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholder on a 
voluntary basis” (European Commission, 2001, p.8) 
In the last decades, a growing number of firms become active in publishing sustainability 
reports. The graph below shows the percentage of companies reporting on CSR information 
among the first 250 companies ranked in Fortune list. 
 
 
Figure 1: Fortune Global 250 companies reporting on CRS 
Source: personal elaboration from KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (2015; 
2013; 2011; 2005; 2002) 
 
 
The Federation of European Accountants highlights the fact that sustainability reporting started 
to be considered a major issue after the financial crisis, “as awareness was arising of the 
negative impact businesses can have on society and the environment.” (FEE 2016, p.5). At that 
point that was an emerging need to rebuild investors’ and consumes’ trust in markets through 
better information regarding both risk management and sustainability. Consequently, European 
Institutions have been active in promoting CRS reporting for the benefit of the society, but also 
as a mean to improve the competitiveness and innovation of European businesses (FEE, 2016). 
This increasing attention toward CSR reporting culminated in the European Directive on Non-
Financial Information (NFI Directive). If the first approach to CRS, as defined by the Green 
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Paper in 2001, was addressing it as a voluntary practice, now the topic is not anymore merely 
voluntary, as reporting on CSR information is not an option in certain cases. Recently, 
sustainability reporting has started to be a matter under the lens of governments and stock 
exchanges around the world. According to the most recent survey of KPMG, “The main driver 
for CR reporting continues to be legislative: there is a growing trend of regulations requiring 
companies to publish non-financial information.” (KPMG 2015, p.30). The first European 
countries to adopt regulations have been France, UK and Scandinavian Countries. In France, 
social environmental reporting is mandatory for listed companies since 2001. In 2010 with the 
Law Grenelle II the range of companies subjected to mandatory reporting has been broadened 
also to non-listed companies reaching certain thresholds (500 employees and 100 million of net 
turnover or total assets). Moreover, external assurance by a third independent party is required 
to guarantee the presence of all information required, and to explain the company’s reasons in 
case of not reporting on some information. In United Kingdom, Company Act, since 2013, 
requires large companies to disclose principal risk and uncertainties and KPI in relation to 
environmental and employees matters. In 2007, the Swedish government required state-owned 
companies to present an independently assured sustainability report in accordance with the GRI 
guidelines. In Denmark, since 2008, large companies, are required to supplement their annual 
management’s review with a report on social responsibility.  
A recent attempt of the European Commission in regulating the issues has been made with the 
Directive regarding disclosure of non-financial and diversity information. The directive 
requires large companies to disclose certain information on the way they operate and manage 
social and environmental challenges. It is interesting, on my opinion, to notice how the theme 
of CSR has shifted from a topic addressed only by Soft Law with the Green Paper of 2001, to 
a topic doomed to enter in the national law of each member states. Italy has transposed the 
directive into national law in 2016, and it has to be applied from the financial year 2017. 
Companies are required to include non-financial statements in their annual reports from 2018 
onwards. This rule applies to large public-interest companies with more than 500 employees. 
This covers approximately 6,000 large companies and groups across the EU. According to the 
European Commission “This helps investors, consumers, policy makers and other stakeholders 
to evaluate the non-financial performance of large companies and encourages these companies 
to develop a responsible approach to business”. (European Commission, 2014) The statutory 
auditor is in charge of verifying the presence of the required information. Additionally, Member 
States may require the assurance of non-financial information by and independent assurance 
provider. (FEE, 2016, p. 9). Topics to be covered within non-financial information are 
environmental protection, social responsibility and treatment of employees, respect for human 
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rights, anti-corruption and bribery, diversity on company boards. Significant freedom is granted 
in term of how to report, although Article 2 of the Directive refers to non-binding guidelines on 
methodology for reporting non-financial information. These guidelines will be further 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
 
1.2 Reporting frameworks 
In this paragraph, I will present the main frameworks to which an organization can refer when 
reporting on CSR information. The frameworks discussed are reported in the table below.  
 
 
Table 1: Main frameworks of disclosure for CSR information 
Source: personal elaboration 
 
It should be born in mind each instrument has its own peculiarities in term of aims and scope. 
Therefore, they should not be looked at as alternative, but rather as complementary instruments 
to be considered in combination for a more comprehensive approach to sustainability reporting. 
I will provide a brief description of each one of them analysing how they treat the topic of 
environmental impact. In describing the different instruments, I will try to underline points of 
contacts and differences among them and to what extent reporting in accordance with one 
framework allows to comply also with the others. 
Framework Issuing entity Purpose
GRI Reporting Guidelines Non profit organization Helping businesses, governments and other 
organizations understand and communicate the 
impact of business on critical sustainability issues
EU Guidelines on NFI EU institution Helping companies disclose high quality, relevant, 
useful, consistent and more comparable non-
financial information
OECD Guidelines Intergovernmental Organization Providing non-binding principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct in a global context 
UNGC (COP) Intergovernmental Organization Informing stakeholders about business efforts to 
implement the principles of the United Nations (UN) 
Global Compact
ISO 26000 Non profit organization Providing a guideline on how businesses and 
organizations can operate in a socially responsible 
way 
Integrated Reporting 
Famework
Non profit organization Improving the quality of information available to 
providers of financial capital to enable a more 
efficient and productive allocation of capital
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Literature has widely recognised Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as the most used 
guidelines for sustainability reporting. (Kolk, Perego, 2012; KPMG 2015). According to the 
most recent KPMG Survey (2015), 60% of the CSR reports surveyed referred to GRI. The 
graph below shows the percentage of reports following GRI framework broken down by 
geographic region in 2013 and 2015.  
 
 
Figure 2: Companies following GRI guidelines by region 
Source: KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (2015) 
 
 
GRI is an international independent organization aimed at helping businesses, governments and 
other organizations to understand and communicate the impact of business on critical 
sustainability issues. GRI guidelines plays a significant role in the harmonization of 
sustainability reporting. Their final objective is, in fact, to give shareholders a tool to analyse 
the CSR performance of companies and compare them. The GRI started publishing non-
financial information reporting guidelines in the 1990s. Since inception, the GRI has gained 
major attention from companies and has become a worldwide reference for reporting. The latest 
version – GRI Standard – has been issued in October 2016 and substituted GRI G4 Guidelines. 
GRI Standard provide framework consisting in a list of items of disclosures and key 
performance indicators that companies can follow in reporting their sustainability performance. 
Standards are grouped into three series of topic specific standards which cover economic, 
environmental and social impact. The environmental dimension, which is defined as “an 
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organization’s impacts on living and non-living natural systems, including land, air, water and 
ecosystems” (GRI, 2016), includes items linked to materials, energy, water, biodiversity, 
emissions, effluents and waste, products and services, compliance and transport.  
Guidelines help companies to report on the material issue of each dimension. GRI Standards 
guides companies in applying a “materiality process” that allow to decide whether an outcome 
is or not sufficiently material to be prioritized for inclusion in the report. In financial reporting, 
where the concept of materiality is deeply rooted, an information is considered material if its 
omission or misstatement could influence decisions that users make on its basis (IASB, 2017). 
Materiality therefore represent the threshold above which a certain information become 
sufficiently important to be disclosed. According to GRI Standard, a similar concept is also 
important in sustainability reporting, where materiality is the principle that determines which 
relevant topics are sufficiently important that it is essential to report on them. Reporting on 
material aspects is relevant to avoid information overload by including immaterial items 
(Unerman and Zappettini, 2014). The materiality assessment proposed by GRI considers a 
combination of internal and external factors that reflect significant economic, environmental, 
and/or social impacts, or for stakeholders’ decision making.  
Beyond GRI, several other parties have issued their own guidelines for sustainability reporting. 
Worth to mention are the recently issued Guidelines of the European Commission, published 
in July 2017, following the Directive 2014/95/EU. With the issue of its own guidelines, the 
European Commission, aims to “help companies disclose high quality, relevant, useful, 
consistent and more comparable non-financial information” (European Commission, 2017, 
p.6). Also the European Commission Guidelines are inspired by the principle of materiality as 
“disclosing immaterial information may make non-financial statement less easy to understand 
since it would obscure material information. Generic or boilerplate information that is not 
material should be avoided” (European Commission, 2017, p.8). Concerning environmental 
matters “a company is expected to disclose relevant information on the actual and potential 
impacts of its operations on the environment, and on how current and foreseeable 
environmental matters may affect the company’s development, performance or position” 
(European Commission, 2017, p.15). The non-exhausting list of thematic aspects that 
companies are expected to consider when dealing with environmental matters include: material 
disclosure on pollution prevention and control, environmental impact from energy use, direct 
and indirect atmospheric emissions, use and protection of natural resources and related 
protection of biodiversity, waste management, environmental impact from the use and disposal 
of products and services, and development of green products and services. 
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Even if the European Commission issued its own guidelines, the Directive gives significant 
freedom to companies concerning the framework to follow for reporting. Following the entry 
into force of the directive, GRI published a document explaining how reporting in accordance 
with GRI allows a company to comply with the Directive. The European Commission 
mentioned also UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprise and the 
ISO 26000 as other possibilities of framework to follow in the reporting of NFI.  
The UN Global Compact is an initiative of the United Nations, created in 2000, aimed at 
encouraging business worldwide to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies. It 
provides general principles that businesses participants have to comply with. The 10 principles 
concern human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. Among them, principles 7, 8 
and 9 are related to environmental issues. They require businesses, respectively, to support 
a precautionary approach to environmental challenges, to undertake initiatives to promote 
environmental responsibility and to encourage the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies. Commitment to UN Global Compact entails also 
submitting an annual Communication in Progress (COP), which means that businesses 
participates are asked to inform stakeholders about their efforts to implement the principles of 
the Global Compact. COP is addressed to stakeholders and should contain a statement by the 
chief executive expressing continued support for the Global Compact, a description of practical 
actions that the company has taken or plans to undertake to implement the Global Compact 
principles in each of the four issue areas (human rights, labour, environment, anti-corruption), 
and a measurement of outcomes (UN Global Compact, 2013). Since the signing of the 
agreement between UN Global Compact and GRI, in 2010, the GRI undertakes to integrate 
UNGC issue areas into its Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Accordingly, GRI Guidelines 
can be used to produce annual COP. 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are recommendations addressed by 
governments to multinational enterprises operating in adhering countries. They provide non-
binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a global context consistent 
with applicable laws and internationally recognised standards. (OECD, 2011). The Guidelines 
address the theme of reporting stating that “enterprises should be transparent in their 
operations and responsive to the public’s increasingly sophisticated demands for information”. 
(OECD, 2011, p.28). For this purpose, reporting standards, such as GRI, provide useful 
references. 
ISO 26000 is a guideline on how businesses and organizations can operate in a socially 
responsible way developed by the International Organization for Standardization in 2005. The 
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environmental dimension encompasses four issues: prevention of pollution, sustainable 
resource use, climate change mitigation and adaptation, protection of the environment, 
biodiversity and restoration of natural habitats. The ISO guidance provides a structure for 
companies to organize their activities but does not offer a practical guidance on reporting. 
Acknowledging that, ISO encourage to report following GRI, which represent “the most 
suitable Guidelines to support organizations interested in reporting on the topics covered by 
ISO 26000 as part of its comprehensive Sustainability Reporting” (GRI, ISO 26000, p.4) 
The last framework I will deal with is the Integrated Reporting Framework (IRF), which has 
been issued by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). IIRC is a global coalition 
of regulators, investors, companies, standard setters and NGOs funded in 2010 with the aim to 
give investors more information about an organization’s value creation. The IRF proposes an 
innovative point of view concerning the reporting approach. Its purpose is to encourage the 
substitution of the numerous and disconnected form of reporting issued by an organization with 
an integrated form of reporting. The final goal is to improve the quality of information available 
to providers of financial capital, enabling a more efficient and productive allocation of capital. 
An Integrated Report is defined as “a concise communication about how an organization’s 
strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, 
lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term”. (IIRC, 2013, p.8). 
Integrated Reporting address the need to draw report readers’ attention to the main connections 
between those social, environmental and economic actions and outcomes, preventing an 
excessive information overload, which would render difficult to appreciate the linkages 
between different social, environmental and economic impacts (De Villers et al, 2014). 
According to Adams, Integrated Reporting represents “the early stage of widespread 
promulgation of a different way of thinking about corporate success and reporting” (Adams, 
2014). 
The IRF establishes Guiding Principles and Content Elements that govern the overall content 
of an Integrated Report. Content elements encompasses eight categories. External environment 
category mention “Environmental challenges, such as climate change, the loss of ecosystems, 
and resource shortages as planetary limits are approached” (IIRC, 2013, p.25). 
GRI has been involved with the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) since its 
inception in 2010. In 2015 GRI and IIRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which 
the two parties acknowledge the complementarity of their respective roles, on the basis that 
sustainability reporting is central to integrated reporting and they are collaborating on the 
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Corporate Leadership Group on Integrated Reporting, bringing together corporate leaders to 
explore the future of integrated and sustainability reporting. 
 
 
 
1.3 Sustainability Reporting Theories 
The main theoretical frameworks for framing and explaining CSR reporting practice are 
Stakeholder Theory, Institutional Theory and Legitimacy Theory. Before narrowing the scope 
of attention to Legitimacy Theory, I will briefly introduce all the three of the three of them, 
analysing similarities, differences and complementarities.  
Legitimacy Theory has become one of the most cited theories within the social and 
environmental accounting area (Tilling, 2004). Legitimacy can be defined as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 
1995, p.574). An organization is legitimate when it is perceived it pursues its goals in a socially 
acceptable manner (Tilling, 2004). 
Many scholars have turned to Stakeholder Theory to better specify better the concepts of CSR 
(Freeman et al 2010). Stakeholder Theory, first conceptualized by Freeman in 1984, is based 
on the idea that businesses should strive to meet the expectation of its stakeholders, where these 
latter are defined as all those that have an influence, and are influenced, by an organization. 
Stakeholder Theory highlights the fact that organization will react to the demand of those 
groups that control resources necessary to the organization operations. The disclosure of 
particular type of information can be explained, drawing on Stakeholder Theory, as a way to 
gain or maintain the support of particular groups. Both Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder 
Theory conceptualize the organization as part of a broader social system wherein the 
organization impacts, and is impacted by, other groups within society. A difference could be 
found in the fact that Stakeholder Theory refers to how a company behave vis-à-vis a particular 
group within society - the stakeholders - whilst Legitimacy Theory discusses the expectation of 
the society in general (Deegan, 2014).   
Institutional Theory considers the processes by which structures, rules, norms, and routines, 
guide social behaviour. According to Campbell (2007), the contribution of Institutional Theory 
is relevant in analysing the conditions that encourage corporations to behave in a social 
responsible way. According to Bebbington et al. (2007), Institutional Theory provides a useful 
complement to both Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder Theory in understanding how 
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organizations respond to changing social and institutional pressure and expectations. The role 
of Institutional Theory is to link organizational practices (such as accounting and corporate 
reporting) to the values of the society in which an organization operates, and to a need to 
maintain it legitimacy (Deegan 2014). 
The further of my discussion will provide a focus on Legitimacy Theory, as I believe is the 
most relevant one when digging into the phenomenon of external assurance of Sustainability 
Report on which I will concentrate from the next chapter onwards. 
Legitimacy Theory suggests that, in order to obtain the right to operate, an organization should 
gain the acceptance by the society. Therefore, legitimacy is threatened if there is a lack of 
correspondence between how society believe an organization should behave and how it is 
perceived that the organization has acted, causing a “legitimacy gap”. This gap worsen when a 
firm shows poor environmental performance (Cho and Patten, 2007; De Villiers and Van 
Staden, 2011). Moreover, Alrazi et al. (2016) underlined the fact that societal expectation could 
change even without a change in organisational functioning, as a result of increased awareness 
of the impacts of corporate activities on the environment. Accordingly, organizations seek 
legitimation strategy to grant their right to operate. Alrazi et al. (2016) underline that firms use 
disclosure to highlight actions taken to bring its performance up to societal expectations, or to 
justify any shortfall, in order to ensure continued access to resources. Reporting and related 
assurance is a strategic tool that organizations can use to influence the community’s perceptions 
of their legitimacy (Choen and Simnett, 2015). 
Legitimacy Theory suggests that companies can be in four different phases regarding their 
legitimacy. The earliest phase is “Establishing Legitimacy” and is typical of an organization in 
the first stage of its development. “Maintaining Legitimacy” is the phase that most of the 
companies have to deal with. The third phase is “Extending Legitimacy” and can be faced when 
an organization enter a new market or expand its domain of activity. Lastly, an organization 
may have to deal with the phase of “Defending Legitimacy”. Ashforth and Gibbs stated that 
“attempts to defend occur when the organization's extant legitimacy is threatened or 
challenged” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p.183). This insight acknowledges that legitimacy is a 
dynamic concept and organizations need to be responsive to the environment in which they 
operate in order not to lose their legitimacy. According to Tilling (2014), the main focus of 
accounting researches tend to be on the phase of “Defending Legitimacy”. This insight seems 
consistent with several attempts in the literature to reconcile environmental disclosure with 
Legitimacy Theory. Cho and Patten (2007), pointed out that firm seeking to maintain legitimacy 
have an incentive to use communication strategies, including financial report disclosure, to 
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potentially influence social perceptions. Companies facing higher public pressure in 
social/political environment, as companies with worse environmental performance provide 
more environmental disclosure comparing to better performers, in an attempt to prevent threats 
on their legitimacy (Cho and Patten, 2007). 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) highlighted the fact that organizations adopt a wide variety of 
practices in the attempt to legitimize their activities and that these practices “shade greyly from 
substantive to symbolic” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p.182). Substantive management refers to 
an approach that involves real, material change in organizational goals, structures, and 
processes, while Symbolic management refers to the case of an organization which simply 
portrays changes to appear consistent with social values and expectations but without substance.  
Researchers have scrutinized different CSR practices to assess whether their role in enhancing 
legitimacy is substantive or symbolic. Berrone et al. (2009) examined the effectiveness of 
symbolic practices such as environmental trademarks and environmental dedicated board 
committee and substantive practices such as pollution prevention and environmental 
innovation. They conclude that substantive actions have a stronger and longer-term effect than 
symbolic actions. Rodrigue et al. (2013) analysed the adherence of environmental governance 
practices either to a symbolic or substantive approach. Focusing on a sample of environmentally 
sensitive firms, they came up with results consistent with environmental governance 
mechanisms being predominantly part of a symbolic approach to manage stakeholder 
perceptions on environmental management, having little substantial impact on organizations. 
External assurance practice is widely used in increasing the confidences in firm’s sustainability 
information. From a legitimacy perspective, the adoption of voluntary assurance statement may 
strengthen and legitimize social responsible activities (Faisal et al., 2012). It is unclear whether 
the role of external assurance in enhancing legitimacy could be considered symbolic or 
substantive. Michelon et al. (2015) found assurance not to be related to the quality or quantity 
of disclosure, leading to consider it a symbolic practice. Conversely, other researchers found 
evidence that firms with voluntary external assurance provide a higher extent of sustainability 
disclosure (Moroney et al., 2009; Faisal et al., 2012). According to Faisal et al. (2012) “This 
result is consistent with Legitimacy Theory that firms voluntarily purchase additional 
assurance services in order to enhance their reputation” (Faisal et al., 2012). 
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2. Assurance of CSR information 
The International Audit and Assurance Standard Board (IAASB)1 defines assurance as “an 
engagement in which a practitioner aims to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence in order to 
express a conclusion designed to enhance the degree of confidence of the intended users other 
than the responsible party about the subject matter information” (IAASB, 2013, p. 7) 
The terms used to describe this process vary and include assurance, external assurance, 
verification, and certification (GRI, 2016). The GRI Standards use the term external assurance 
to refer to activities designed to result in published conclusions on the quality of the report and 
the information contained within it. The latest version of GRI Standard states that external 
assurance it is not required in order to claim that a report has been prepared in accordance with 
the GRI Standards although it is advised to enhance the credibility of the report (GRI, 2016).  
EU Guidelines on non-financial information disclosure mention the independent external 
assurance as a way to make information fairer and more accurate (European Commission, 
2017). In KPMG view, assurance is no longer just an option and companies should question 
themselves not about whether to assure sustainability disclosure, but rather about how to choose 
the appropriate assurance option that meet stakeholders’ needs. (KPMG, p.12, 2013).  
This chapter aims at providing a thorough analysis of the existing academic literature on the 
topic of sustainability assurance. Assurance practice has been subject to scrutiny of several 
academic studies focusing on different aspects. According to Faroq and De Villers (2017), 
researches in the field of sustainability assurance can be divided into five categories. The first 
category encompasses researches that undertake a macro examination of the practice examining 
the scope and objective of assurance engagements and evolutionary trend. The second refers to 
studies investigating factors that drive the demand of assurance engagement. The third, is 
comprised by several researchers evaluating assurance statements in an attempt to identify 
similarities and differences between accountants and non-accountants practitioners. Fourth, 
academics have tried to analyse the role played by assurance in enhancing stakeholders 
perceived credibility of sustainability reports. Finally, researches concentrated on the 
challenges faced by assurance providers and on the potential role of accounting profession in 
assurance market. I have tried to sort the most relevant articles I have reviewed for writing this 
                                                 
1 The IAASB is a body supported by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
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chapter into the five categories proposed by Faroq and De Villers (2017). The table below report 
the sorting of the articles in the five categories. 
 
 
Table 2: Sorting the articles focusing on sustainability assurance into five areas of research 
Source: personal elaboration 
 
 
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows: the first three paragraphs will try to answer 
to the questions: “what is an assurance engagement”, “why organization seek assurance”, and 
“who perform the assurance engagement”. Articles clustered in the former three categories will 
mainly constitute the basis for these three paragraphs. The fourth paragraph will summarize all 
criticisms emerged in the literature over the practices of assurance, looking for seeds of 
criticisms in all the articles clustered the five different categories. The last paragraph will focus 
on the link between assurance and the extent of disclosure provided, which will be the focus of 
my research. Previous articles that investigated this topic are included in the category “Role of 
SA in enhancing the credibility of SR”. The chapter will end up with the definition of the 
research questions. 
 
Group Area of research Authors Journal
Junior et al (2012) Journal of Business Ethics
Mock et al (2013) Australian Accounting Review
Cohen and Simnett (2014) Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
Kolk and Perego (2009) Journal of Business Ethics
Kolk and Perego (2012) Journal of Business Ethics
Kolk and Perego (2010) Business Strategy and the Environmant
Gillet Monjaret (2015). Accounting in Europe
Braam and Peters (2017) Corporate Social Responsibility and environmental management
Manett and Becatti (2009) Journal of Business Ethics
Perego (2009) Journal of International Management
O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) The British Accounting Review
O’Dwyer and Owen (2007) The Journal of Corporate Citizenship
Moroney et al. (2009) Accounting and Finance
Ball and Otehrs (2000) Business Strategy and the Environmant
Sinmett and Others (2009) The Accounting Review 
Sinmett and Others (2011) Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory
Faisal et al (2012) Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal
Coram & Other (2009) Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory
Wong and Millington (2014) Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
Michelon et al (2015) Critical Perspective on Accounting
Gray (2000) International Journal of Auditing
Owen et al (2000) The European Accounting Review
Adams and Evans (2004) The Journal of Corporate Citizenship
Deegan et al (2006) Managerial Auditing Journal
O'Dywer (2011) Accounting Organizations and Society
Statistical breack up of 
the market of SA
Factors that drive the 
demand of SA services
Differences among 
different type of 
assurance providers
Role of SA in 
enahncing the 
credibility of SR
Role of accountants in 
the SA market
1
2
3
4
5
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2.1 The role of assurance providers 
Assurance statements should address the questions: “Does this report give an account of the 
company and its performance that readers can rely on?” and “is the report complete, accurate, 
honest and balanced in its portrayal of the organisation?” (Adams and Evans, p.101, 2004). 
The assuror’s key tasks are to assess and report on the completeness and credibility of a 
company’s sustainability report, and the extent to which the company is responding to its 
stakeholders’ concerns and interests. Assurance providers should act on behalf of stakeholder 
to ensure they receive all the information to which they are entitled (Adams and Evans, 2004). 
Gillet-Monjarret (2017) defines Sustainability Assurance as “a disciplinary mechanism that 
certifies the reliability of sustainable reports and contributes to its credibility by reducing 
agency conflicts” (Gillet-Monjarret, p. 5, 2017). The European Commission argues that: 
“Verification by independent third parties of the information published in social responsibility 
reports is also needed to avoid criticism that the reports are public relations schemes without 
substance. Indeed such services are already beginning to be offered by a variety of companies, 
which would need to perform them following agreed standards. The involvement of 
stakeholders, including trade unions and NGOs, could improve the quality of verification.” 
(European Commission, p.21, 2001). 
External assurance of sustainability reports is similar to financial audit, but it presents several 
additional criticalities (GRI, 2016). The main issue is due to the fact that sustainability 
assurance involves different kind of information on heterogeneous subject matters. 
Additionally, while for financial accounting there are long-established procedures, 
sustainability reporting deals with topics that are more critical to manage, measure and disclose. 
The main differences pointed out are the diversity of the subject matter examined, the absence 
of well-developed criteria and the lack of analytical rigor that arises in double entry system 
(Choen and Simnett, 2015). Additionally, the sustainability assurance is prepared for a broad 
range of stakeholders with different and often competing interests, in contrast with the financial 
audit which is prepared primarily for shareholders (Adams and Evans, 2004). Rasche and Esser 
(2006) raised the issue that stakeholder claims are never homogenous and that it is difficult to 
build consensus without being dominated by any party but by legitimate interests. Consistently, 
Unerman and Bennett (2004) stated that is difficult to determine a consensus set of stakeholder 
expectations from a range of potentially mutually exclusive views held by different 
stakeholders. Accordingly, the practice of sustainability assurance is the more and more 
concerned with the issue of stakeholder engagement. Manetti and Toccafondi analysed 160 
assurance statements contained in each sustainability reports for the years 2009 and 2010 
24 
 
finding that, in the large majority of the cases, stakeholders were consulted by assurance 
providers during the assurance service. They concluded that “Practice and theory have also 
shown the need for assurance practices to evolve from a mere check on data and information 
contained in the report to a more thorough control of the level of stakeholder engagement in 
SR, as well as of the alignment of corporate strategies with stakeholder expectations, in a 
climate of mutual commitment.” (Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012, p, 366) 
There are different national and international standards for assurance of sustainability 
information. The two most widespread ones are the ISAE 3000 (IAASB, 2004) and AA1000 
Assurance Standard (ISEA, 2003). ISAE 3000 is a generic standard used for all assurance other 
than financial audit, which has been issued in 2004 by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standard Board (IAASB), the issuing agency of the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC). Only professional accountants can issue an assurance statement in accordance with 
ISAE 3000. Conversely, AA1000 Assurance Standard is addressed to anyone who provides 
external verification services. This latter has been issued in 2003 by the Institute of Social and 
Ethical Accountability (ISEA), a British no-profit organization. 
Different variables play a role in shaping the nature of assurance engagement. Assurance may 
vary considerably in terms of the choice of the assurance provider, of the scope and level of 
assurance. (Braam, 2017). As far as the scope is regarded, this can range from assurance on 
information disclosed in specific sections of the report to assurance provided for the entire 
sustainability report. Concerning the level of assurance achieved, this can be, depending on the 
characteristics of the subject matter and investigation implemented, a limited or a reasonable 
assurance. A reasonable level of assurance means that the auditor finds information reported to 
be compliant with requirements, while a limited level of assurance is solely aimed at stating 
that nothing has come to the attention of the assurance providers to indicate the information is 
not presented in accordance with criteria (Hodge, 2009). The choice of which level of assurance 
should be desirable is quite discussed in literature. Manetti and Becatti (2009), are in favour of 
a limited assurance, claiming that, due to the complexity in investigating all the topics contained 
in a sustainability report, it will never be possible to guarantee highly reliable verification. 
According to other point of views, reports’ users place more confidence in the information 
reported when the level of assurance providers is reasonable (Hodge, 2009).  Moreover, both 
reporting companies and assurance providers have been criticized for exploiting the possibility 
of using limited assurance at their own advantage. According to O’Dywer and Owen (2005), 
limited assurance can be used to prevent the risk of litigation costs for assurance providers. 
Braan (2017) claims that managers of companies with a poor environmental performance may 
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take advantage of assurance practice by choosing limited assurance on specific sections of the 
sustainability report to manage stakeholder perception. 
Adams and Evans (2004) mentions the following as activities normally involved in an assurance 
work: 
• Interviewing managers and staff concerning policies, information management systems 
and controls in place. 
• Testing systems and data. 
• Reviewing accounting process. 
• Consulting stakeholder representative where necessary. 
• Checking commentary and graphical presentations in the report for consistency with the 
underlying data and to ensure that they do not misinterpret performance.   
• Documenting investigation and findings. 
The result of the work is the issue of an assurance statement drawing conclusions on the 
information in the report reviewed (Owen and O’Dywer, 2005). The assurance statement may 
be disclosed as part of the sustainability reporting process. Form and content of the statement 
vary depending on the scope, standard used and, to some extent, on the assurance provider 
preferences (GRI, 2013). The assurance statement should define the intended audience of the 
assurance statement, the scope and level of the assurance process, the criteria and 
methodologies used by the reporter, the standard used by the assurance provider to guide the 
assurer’s approach. A summary of the actions performed by the assurance providers, 
mentioning any noteworthy limitations, could be included. Additionally, some assurance 
reports include a summary of recommendations for further actions. The assurance statement 
usually ends with a conclusion indicating whether the assured information is fairly presented, 
free of material misstatements and reported in accordance with reporting criteria. The statement 
is dated and signed by the most senior executive responsible for the assurance. 
For instance, the assurance statement issued by EY for the Sustainability Report of Eni (2016) 
defines the intended audience as “To the Board of Directors of Eni S.p.A”. The level of 
assurance is specified when saying “We have carried out limited assurance engagement" and 
again when saying “Our examination has entailed a lower extension of work compared to the 
work to be performed for a reasonable assurance engagement in accordance with ISAE 3000 
and, as consequence, we may not have become aware of all the significant events and 
circumstances which we could have identified had we performed a reasonable assurance 
engagement.” The topic of criteria and methodologies used by the reporter is addressed in the 
sentence “The Directors are responsible for the preparation of the Report in accordance with 
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the G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines”, while the standard used by the assurance provider 
in "Our work has been conducted in accordance with the criteria established by the principle 
International Standard on Assurance Engagement 3000 issued by IAASB for the engagements 
that consist in a limited assurance.” The actions performed are summarized as follows: 
“Comparison of the economic and financial data and information included in the Report with 
those included in the Eni Group’s consolidated financial statement as of December 31, 2016 
on which we issued our audit report…”; “Analysis, through interviews, of the governance 
system and management process of the issues related to sustainable development regarding Eni 
Group’s strategy and operations”; “Analysis of the process relating to the definition of 
material aspects included in the Report, with reference to the identification modalities in terms 
of their priority for the different stakeholders ‘categories and to the internal validation of the 
process outcome”; ”Analysis of the operation of the processes that support the generation, 
recording and management of quantitative data reported in the Report…”; “ Analysis of 
compliance and internal consistency of the qualitative information included in the Report to the 
guidelines identified in the paragraph Directors‘ responsibility on the Report of the present 
report”; “Analysis of the process relating to the stakeholders engagement, with reference to 
the procedures applied, through the review of the summary minutes or any other existing 
documentation relating to the main topics emerged from discussion with them”; “Obtaining of 
the representation letter, signed by the legal representative of Eni S.p.A., relating to the 
compliance of the Report with the guidelines indicated in the paragraph Directors‘ 
responsibility on the Report, as well as to the reliability and completeness of the information 
and data presented in the Report.” The statement does not provide any recommendations for 
further actions. Conclusion states that “Based on our work, nothing has come to our attention 
that cause us to believe that Eni for 2016-Sustainability Report of Eni Group as of December 
31, 2016 is not in compliance, in all material aspects, with the guidelines G4 Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines and Oil & Gas Sector Disclosures issued in 2013 by the GRI – Global 
Reporting Initiative, as stated in the paragraph Reporting principles and criteria of the Report.” 
The report is dated as of 6th April 2017 and signed by an EY Partner. 
The main features of the assurance statement described are summarized in the table below, 
while the whole assurance statement is included in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: Main features of Independent auditor's report on "Eni for 2016-Sustainability Report" 
 
 
 
2.2 Why organization seek assurance 
The voluntary demand of independent verification can be explained by a willingness to enhance 
sustainability report’s credibility vis-à-vis stakeholders (Kolk and Perego, 2012). Third-party 
assurance can improve stakeholders' confidence in the credibility of the sustainability 
information provided and thus enhance the corporate reputation (Simnett et al., 2009). 
According to GRI, external assurance reflects the seriousness with which companies approach 
sustainability reporting (GRI, 2013). 
Literature has found the voluntary assurance decision to be influenced by a number of internal 
and external drivers (Farooq and De Villers, 2017). External drivers are primarily: size, 
industry, and county of origin. Size plays a role in the sense that large listed companies are 
more likely to seek assurance (Simnett et al., 2009). In terms of industry membership, studies 
have found that organisations operating in environmentally sensitive industries are more likely 
to purchase assurance service (Cho et al., 2014). Kolk and Perego (2010) argued that the main 
determinants for the adoptions of external assurance are county level variables rather than firm 
or industry specific factors. There is a general agreement in the literature on the fact that 
companies located in more stakeholder-oriented countries are more likely to have their report 
assured (Kolk and Perego, 2010; Simnett et al., 2009). In stakeholder-oriented countries, 
characterized by a higher focus on company ability to create value beyond wealth 
maximization, there is a higher need to increase the confidence of stakeholders in the credibility 
of information disclosed. Authors tend to consider North American countries, the UK and 
Ireland as shareholder oriented and European countries, excluding the UK and Ireland, more 
stakeholder oriented. This reasoning is consistent with the finding of Kolk (2010) that, 
Title: Independent auditor's report on "Eni for 2016-Sustainability Report"
Intended Audience: Board of Directors of Eni S.p.A
Level of assurance: Limited
Methodology udes by the reporter: G4 Sustainability Reporting Guielines 
Standard used by the assurance provider: ISAE 3000 
Actions performed: Summary of the main procedures undertaked
Conclusion: no reasons to belive the Report is not complying with Guidelines
Report date: Rome, April 6, 2017
Signature: Massimo Antonelli, Partner
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analysing Fortune Global 250 firms, find out that assurance practice is much more widespread 
in Europe.  
An additional external driver in encouraging organization to seek assurance is media pressure. 
A study of Gillet-Monjarret (2015) on French listed companies, comparing assurance demands 
between 2007 and 2010, found that higher levels of negative media exposure positively 
influence the demand for sustainability assurance. Accordingly, media pressure increases the 
need to enhance the credibility of SR through assurance.  
Since independent assurance is a costly mechanism, consistent benefits should be expected 
form this voluntary choice (Kolk and Perego, 2010). Clarkson et al (2015) examined the 
potential benefits associated with external assurance of CSR disclosure. Their findings suggest 
that assurance plays an incremental role in increasing the chance for reporting firm to be 
included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) and, therefore, to attract more 
sustainable responsible investments. O’Dywer (2011) states that one of the argument that 
assurers use to boost their reputational value is the increased likelihood of inclusion on 
sustainability indices such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and/or the FTSE4Good Index. 
Coram (2009) examined the role of voluntary assurance on the share price of reporting 
organization. The research method consisted in an experiment giving participants a hypothetical 
annual report with both financial and non-financial information, some of which were assured, 
while others were not. The panel of financial expert and accountants involved in the experiment 
has been asked whether they believed the company’s stock price would increase or decrease 
based on the information provided. Results suggest that assurance only had a significant effect 
on stock price estimates when the non-financial performance indicators were positive. Findings 
of Cho et al. (2014), instead, are inclined toward an irrelevant effect of assurance on stock price. 
In the panel of 216 CSR reports published by US companies ranked amongst the Fortune 500, 
they find assurance not to be associated with higher market value for report-issuing 
companies.  
 
 
 
2.3 Types of assurance providers 
External assurance of sustainability disclosures can be offered by a variety of service providers. 
Traditionally the market of assurance providers has been divided between certification bodies, 
and the Big-4 professional service firms (O’Dwyer, 2011). The GRI (2013) proposes a 
distinction into three categories: accounting firm, which are traditionally engaged in the audit 
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of financial report, engineering firms, that normally offer technical certifications and 
engineering expertise, and sustainability service firms, recognized because of their expertise 
with stakeholder and sustainability issues (GRI, 2013, p.10). Perego (2009) also distinguished 
between three categories: accounting firms, certification bodies and specialist consultancies. 
Junior et al. (2014), analysing assurance statement of companies listed in Fortune 500 for the 
year 2010, clustered the market of assurance providers into four categories. Accountants and 
non-accountants are the two more widely recognized categories. The third category is 
represented by “Third Party Review” performed by a different range of entities or individuals, 
such as stakeholder panels, academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and 
presidents/directors of international institutes operating in the sustainability reporting area. The 
fourth category refers to a “Mixed Approach”, which means using two different types of 
assurance providers in the same sustainability report (an accounting firm combined with a non-
accounting firm, or an accounting firm combined with a stakeholder or specialist review). They 
notice that accounting firms, which represent the dominant typology of assurance provider, 
perform most assurance engagements in European countries, Brazil and Canada. As far as the 
other three categories are concerned, stakeholder or specialist reviews was used by 
organizations in Japan, China and South Korea, the mixed approach was used only in Spain and 
Japan and non-accounting firms have dominance in Taiwan, US, India, Australia and China.  
The figure below, retrieved from Junior at al. research (2014), summarizes the type of assurance 
providers for companies in the Fortune Global 500 list in 2010 by country. 
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Figure 3: Type of assurance provider by country for companies in the Fortune Global 500 list in 2010 
Source: Junior et al. (2014) 
 
 
Regardless the fact that there is no univocal taxonomy of the assurance providers, what the 
literature seems to agree on is the fact that the market is dominated by accounting firms (Kolk, 
2010; Junior et al., 2014; Kolk and Perego, 2012; GRI, 2003). This evidence is confirmed by 
the most recent KPMG survey (2015), which shows that 65% of top 250 of the Fortune Global 
500 have their report assured by one of the major accountancy organization and, among the 100 
biggest companies in the 45 countries surveyed by KPMG, 64% of them relied on accountancy 
organization.  
 
 
Figure 4: Assurance providers for the years 2013 and 2015 
Source: KPMG (2015) 
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Prior researches have shown that substantive differences in the quality of assurance provided 
by assurors coming from different backgrounds can be found (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; 
Perego, 2009; Kok and Prego, 2012). The approaches to sustainability assurance differs 
significantly between accountants and consultants, the two dominant professional groups in the 
market for third-party verification (Kolk and Perego, 2012). Perego (2009) conducted an 
analysis of assurance statement provided by different categories of assurance practitioners 
finding significant difference in the end result of the assurance engagement. On one side, Big-
4 accounting firms put more emphasis on aspects related to “reporting format” and “assurance 
procedures”. On the other side, the “quality of the recommendations” and “opinions in a 
sustainability assurance statement” is positively associated with non-accounting assurance 
providers. Generally, accountants, seems to be hesitant to draw clear and precise conclusions 
from the assurance engagement given the uncertainties surrounding the domain of sustainability 
assurance provision (Perego, 2009). Conversely, consultants appear to adopt a more strategic 
approach to the audit exercise, which might be considered as adding value to the process from 
the perspective of external stakeholder group (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005).  
For instance, the assurance statement issued by TUV Austria Hellas for the Sustainability 
Report of Hellenic Petroleum mentions also three recommendations for the improvement of the 
company’s future Sustainability Reports, namely “Harmonize the procedures and data 
collection systems of all companies within the boundaries of the Report; extend the boundaries 
of the Report to include more companies of the Hellenic Petroleum Group; On site visit in more 
installations of the Hellenic Petroleum Groups within the boundaries of the Report.” The full 
assurance statement for the Sustainability Report of Hellenic Petroleum is included in the 
Appendix. 
The question of which assurance provider should be preferable is an open debate in the 
literature. Arguments in favour of choosing an auditor are reputation, well developed standards, 
independence and ethical requirements. Big-4 are argued to be more independent, since their 
big dimension make them not dependent on any one client. (Perego and Kolk, 2012; Simnett et 
al., 2009). Gray (2000) highlighted the potential for the accounting profession to perform a key 
role in the area of sustainability assurance, since accountants benefit from their skill set coming 
from financial auditing. Based on these arguments, Simnett et al (2009) classified members of 
the auditing profession as higher quality assurance providers. 
On the other hand, accounting firms have been criticized for lack of competences to operate in 
the field (Power, 1997). Environmental consultants appear to be more expert in the subject 
matter (Simnett et al., 2009). This argument can be demolished considering that big audit firms 
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can hire subject matter specialist to enhance their expertise. The ISAE 3000 explicitly foresees 
the possibility that auditors rely on the contribution of experts from other fields (Manetti and 
Becatti, 2009, p. 3).  
Some researches have investigated which kind of assurance provider is preferred by different 
categories of stakeholders. Pflugrath et al. (2011) examined whether financial analysts from 
Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom perceive a difference in the credibility of 
stand-alone sustainability reports depending on the type of assurance provider. The results show 
that financial analysts from the United States perceive information as more credible when the 
assurer is a professional accountant. Financial analysts from Australia and the United Kingdom 
perceive little difference in the enhanced credibility provided by the different assurance 
providers. Wong and Millington (2014) investigate assurance from the perspective of diverse 
stakeholders group through a questionnaire survey in UK. Findings point out the relevance 
of specialist environmental assurors and, accordingly, the preference toward specialist 
assurors rather than financial auditors. Hence, no clear opinion on which is the preferable 
assurance provider seems to exist. 
In this context of freedom to select among different assurance providers and no clarity about 
which assurance provider should be considered preferable, literature has investigated factors 
that lead companies to choose whom to appoint for assuring its sustainability information. The 
main drivers found are size and country level factors. Company size plays a role to the extent 
that bigger firms are more likely to choose an auditing firm (Simnett et al., 2009). Concerning 
the country level factors, there is a general agreement on the fact that companies operating in 
more stakeholder oriented countries are more likely to choose an auditing professional assurer 
(Simnett et al., 2009; Braan, 2017). Perego (2009) found the tendency is greater among firms 
in countries with weak law enforcement because auditing serves as substitute of other 
institutions.  
Some attempts to reconcile the assurance practice with the sustainability performance has also 
been made. Findings highlight the fact that companies with higher sustainability performance 
are more likely to choose a provider form the accounting profession, a broader scope and a 
higher level of third-party assurance (Braan 2017). 
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2.4 Criticisms on assurance practice 
A great debate exists in the literature about whether social, ethical and sustainability accounts 
and reports should be audited, and about the quality and usefulness of audit of assurance 
statements. (Adams and Evans, 2004). As Owen and O’Dywer (2005) underlined, studies of 
assurance practices have raised serious questions over the credibility of that practice and as to 
whether they provide any added value form a stakeholder perspective. The purpose of this 
chapter is to highlight the focus of the empirical studies and identify the broad problem areas 
and criticalities emerged up to date. Concerns emerged in the literature mainly refer to the 
absence of stakeholder participation during the assurance process, the lack of independence of 
the assurance provider, the lack of specific regulation, the existence of a financial interest in 
performing the engagement and the triggering of a practice known as “managerial capture”. 
The table below summarizes the main criticism addressed to the assurance practices existing in 
the literature up to date. 
 
 
Table 4: Main critics existing in the literature toward assurance practice 
Source: Personal Elaboration 
 
Deegan et al. (2006), analysing European and UK assurance statements form the years between 
2000 and 2003, criticized the variability in the content of assurance statement and the lack of 
details in describing the process performed, claiming that this lack of standardization 
undermines the credibility of assurance statement. Manetti and Becatti (2009) examined 34 
sustainability assurance statement issued by both auditors and others assurance providers for 
the year 2006. They underlined inconsistencies regarding scope of assurance, criteria employed 
Critic Authors
Lack of specific criteria
Deegan & Othes (2006)
Manenti & Beccati (2009)
Junior & Others (2010)
Lack of stakeholder engagement
O'Dywer & Owen (2007)
Adams & Evans (2004)
Lack of independence of the 
assurance provider 
Ball & Other (2000)
O'Dywer & Owen (2005)
Financial interest
Power (1997)
Owen & Others (2000)
Kolk & Perego (2012)
Managerial capture
Owen & Others (2000)
Manurung & Basuki (2010) 
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and levels of assurance provided. They criticized the most widespread standard for assurance 
engagement, the ISAE 3000, for not being specifically tied to sustainability assurance and 
suggest the need of specific guidelines for assurance providers. Junior et al. (2014) analysed 
reporting and assurance trend in Fortune Global 500 firms in 2010 and claimed that the lack of 
specific regulation about assurance process and the differences among assurance services 
provided by different practitioners could contribute to the uncertainties about assurance 
practice. 
Adams and Evans (2004) claimed the need to give stakeholders more power on issues such as 
appointment of auditors and determination of audit scope. O'Dwyer and Owen (2007) undertake 
a detailed examination of assurance statement and pointed out the lack of stakeholder 
involvement in assurance and the reluctance to specify addressee of assurance statements. 
O’Dywer et al. (2011) investigated how accountancy firms strive to establish their legitimacy 
in the field of sustainability assurance both with clients and user audience. They defined lack 
of stakeholders engagement a key barrier to developing legitimacy for assurance and underlined 
an emerging effort to involve stakeholders in the assurance process as a way to overcome the 
barrier. 
Ball et al. (2000) pointed out much evidence of auditee control over the process and 
accordingly, a lack of independence of the assurance provider. They performed a content 
analysis of 53 environmental reports and related third-party verification statements published 
by UK companies, with the aim to evaluate the extent to which third-party assurance promotes 
transparency and empowerment of external stakeholders. O’Dywer and Owen (2005) criticized 
the fact that assurance providers are engaged by management, which may restrict the assurance 
process as they wish, and that assurance statements are primarily addressed to management. 
Criticism have addressed also the cost of assurance practice. Cost, in fact, has been observed to 
be one of the major drawback of the decision to assure (Simnett et al., 2009; Kolk and Perego, 
2010). Big-4 are considered by literature as the most expensive assurance providers. While 
someone, has seen in this a signal of higher quality assurance service (Simnett et al., 2009), 
others have criticized them for taking advantage of their reputation to increase profit operating 
in a field where they have no legitimacy (Power, 1997). Owen et al. (2000) pointed out that 
accounting firms cannot be objective since they have financial interest in the audit. 
Additionally, assurance providers have been criticized for taking advantage of the service. Kolk 
and Pergo (2012) claimed that they pursue their own commercial interest through different 
means: for instance, limiting the scope of their engagements in order to minimise any potential 
liabilities and litigation costs. 
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Concerns have raised about the control management of the reporting company exercises over 
the assurance process. Owen et al. (2000) noted that sustainability assurance is subject to 
“managerial capture”, meaning that it seems management take control of the whole process. 
Manurung and Basuki (2010) highlight evidence that management has control over the scope 
of assurance. Accordingly, managers of companies with a poor environmental performance 
may choose assurance solely on specific sections of the sustainability report to manage 
stakeholder perception (Braam, 2017). 
Consequently, sustainability assurance seems more a managerial tool rather than a real 
instrument of accountability (O’Dywer and Owen, 2005). The criticism of “managerial 
capture” could seem consistent with the idea of assurance as a symbolic practice. Management 
would hijack assurance to their own advantage, strategically restricting disclosure to 
information that will enhance corporate reputation (Gillet-Monjarret, 2017). In this perspective, 
assurance result a symbolic practice unable to guaranteeing a real commitment toward CSR. 
This insight seems consistent with the findings of Michelon et al. (2015), which lead to consider 
assurance as a symbolic practice that firm use to influence stakeholder perception of corporate 
commitment toward CSR (Michelon et al., p. 34, 2015). 
 
 
 
2.5 Assurance and quality of disclosure 
The previous paragraph should have made clear that the debate on the value relevance of 
assurance is open. Accordingly, it is arguable whether it is worth to purchase assurance service. 
Couched within this debate, few studies have tried to examine the role of assurance in enhancing 
accountability, testing whether assurance is related with a higher level of disclosure. It seems 
in fact reasonable to question whether the decision of “investing” in sustainability assurance is 
accompanied by a commitment to disclose more and better information.   
Previous researches that analysed the relation between assurance and disclosure quality have 
come up with mixed results. Some researchers find a positive correlation between assurance 
and quality of disclosure (Moroney et al., 2009; Faisal et al 2012), while others did not 
(Michelon et al., 2015). If only few researches have examined the role of assurance in enhancing 
the quality of disclosure, even fewer have investigated if different evidence could be reconciled 
with different assurance providers. Moroney et al. (2009) enquired whether quality of 
environmental disclosure can be linked to whom performed the assurance engagement. Their 
results showed no significant difference in environmental disclosure among companies that use 
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different assurance providers. Similarly, Clarkson et al. (2015) found that external assurance 
seems to be a signal of an effective commitment to CRS, but there is no relation between 
commitment and the choice of assurance providers. 
Since literature provides contrasting evidence on the role of assurance in enhancing the quality 
of reporting, my work is aimed at digging deeper in this debate. The objective of my research 
is twofold. First, I want to investigate a topic on which literature has not a clear opinion. Second, 
I want to provide an added value comparing to the previous researches. My work will seek to 
propose a more comprehensive approach in measuring the extent of disclosure comparing to 
previous researches. All researches in this field relied on content analysis based on a disclosure 
framework, usually based on GRI item of disclosure. What differs significantly among the work 
performed by previous researchers are the procedures used in developing an index that measure 
the extent of disclosure. Faisal et al. (2012) simply awarded a score of zero or one depending 
on whether a certain item has been disclosed or not. Moroney et al. (2009) acknowledged the 
limits of a dichotomous disclosure or non-disclosure data approach and proposed a scale of zero 
to six to measure the extent of disclosure. Michelon et al. (2015) proposed an approach which 
attempts to better capture the complexity of the information that management can communicate. 
They argued that the quantity of information alone is a poor indicator, and proposed to combine 
it with other dimension of quality such as density, accuracy and managerial orientation 
(Michelon et al., p. 32, 2015). Relying on the insight of Michelon et al. (2015), I will try to 
develop a similar framework in an attempt to gathering evidence also on the quality of 
disclosure, not only on the quantity. Differently from their work, I will concentrate solely on 
the practice of assurance and on environmental dimension for companies belonging to 
environmentally sensitive industries. Michelon et al. (2015) analysed the impact on 
sustainability disclosure of three different CRS practices, namely the issue of standalone report, 
the use of GRI reporting guidance and the assurance. Conversely, my work will focus only on 
the assurance practices and on the type of assurance provider chosen.  
Another difference of my work comparing to previous ones is the geographical area of analysis 
taken into account. Michelon et al. (2015) and Moroney et al. (2009) have focused their 
researches on a single country: UK the first and Australia in the second. Faisal et al. (2012) 
have used a random sample of companies belonging to 24 different countries. My research will 
be focused on a sample of European companies, analysing therefore the trend in an area which 
has not been previously investigated. 
The flowing table summarizes research methodologies and findings of previous studies: 
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Table 5: Papers analysing the link between assurance and disclosure 
Source: personal elaboration 
 
The objective of my research is, therefore, to analyse with a positivist approach whether quality 
of disclosure can be associated with the choice of sustainability assurance. The first hypothesis 
that I will test is: 
H1: Firms with external assurance of their sustainability reports provide higher quality of 
environmental disclosure than firms with no assurance statement. 
Additionally, moving from the idea that Big-4 are more costly assurance providers, I will test 
whether choosing a Big-4 is accompanied by a higher disclosure. This lead to the second 
hypothesis: 
H2: Firms that choose a Big-4 as assuror provide higher quality of environmental disclosure 
than firms that choose other assurance providers. 
  
Authors Companies Examined Reaserch methods Results
Moroney et al. (2009)
Companies listed in the 
Australian Security Exchange for 
the years between 2003 and 
2007
Content analysis using an 
Environmental Disclosure Index 
based on GRI. A scale of zero to 
six is used to measure the 
quality of environmental 
disclosure
-Positive relation between 
assurance and environmental 
disclosure quality
- No difference depending 
whether assurance is provided 
by accountants or consultants
Faisal et al. (2012)
Public companies form 24 
different countries for the year 
2009
Content analysis using a 
Sustainability Disclosure Index 
based on GRI. For each item it is 
awarded a score of 1 if 
disclosed and of 0 if not. 
- Firms with assurance 
statement provide higher 
quality of sustainability 
disclosure
Michelon et al. (2015)
UK companies over the years 
2005, 2006, 2007
Content analysis using a 
framework based on content, 
type of information and 
managerial orientation and 
based on GRI
-Assurance is not significantly 
associated with disclosure 
quality
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3. Research method 
The objective of this research is to study whether the presence of external assurance is related 
to higher environmental disclosure quality. The research has been conducted analysing the 
trends reported within a sample of selected companies. The quality of disclosure provided has 
been investigated conducting a content analysis of environmental information disclosed by each 
company either in a dedicated report either in the annual report.  
This chapter is aimed at describing in detail how the empirical research has been conducted. In 
the first paragraph, I will introduce the sample of analysis describing the steps which has been 
followed to construct it. The second paragraph will describe the framework and the procedure 
used to conduct the content analysis of the reports examined. The last paraph will provide 
specification of the empirical analysis used to test the two hypotheses. 
The end scope of this chapter is to explain how the data set has been constructed. The inference 
on the data gathered will be the subject matter of the next chapter.  
 
 
3.1 The sample 
Industry has been found as one of the main determinant of environmental disclosure and it is 
generally recognized in the literature that environmentally sensitive industries tend to report 
more on sustainability matters. Kolk (2010) stated that more polluting sectors have traditionally 
been more active in reporting. Cho and Patten (2007) demonstrated that firms operating in 
environmentally sensitive industries tend to disclose more than companies operating in non-
sensitive industry (Cho and Patten, 2007; Kolk, 2010). Relying on this evidence, I decided to 
focus the scope of attention of my research on companies operating in environmentally sensitive 
industries.  
The first step I took in order to select companies to be included in the sample it has been to 
consult the EU ETS (Emission Trading Scheme) Company Database2. The database provides 
strategic information and carbon data about more than 1000 companies form 31 European 
countries and it aims is to be “a powerful tool for helping professionals conducting a carbon 
footprint analysis” (Carbon Market Data, p.6). I believed that, in the actual context of high 
                                                 
2 www.carbonmarketdata.com 
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concerns for climate changes and emission reduction, framing an analysis of environmental 
disclosure on emission intensive companies could be interesting and meaningful. 
The EU ETS (Emission Trading Scheme) is the system introduced by the European Union in 
2005 to cut emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and greenhouse gases. European Commission 
define the EU ETS as “the cornerstone of the European Union’s drive to reduce its emissions 
of manmade greenhouse gases which are largely responsible for warming the planet and 
causing climate change” (European Commission, 2016, p.1). The system harnesses market 
forces to find the cheapest ways to reduce emissions: it sets a limit on overall emission from 
covered installations and it allows companies to buy and sell emission allowances as needed 
within this limit. The purpose is to guarantee companies the flexibility they need to cut their 
emission in the most cost-effective way. The practical result is that a price is assigned to carbon 
and, accordingly, a financial value to each tone of emission saved. Emission allowances are the 
“currency” of the EU ETS, and the limit on the total number available gives them a value. Each 
allowance gives the holder the right to emit one tonne of CO2, or the equivalent amount of two 
other greenhouse gases. Emission allowances are allocated through auctions. For the emissions 
which are not covered by allowances, companies need either to buy additional allowances, 
either to draw on surpluses allowances saved from previous years. Companies can also sell 
allowances. This give an incentive to companies to reduce their emissions by investing in more 
efficient technology or shifting to less carbon-intensive energy sources, while allowing them to 
choose the most cost-effective options to address their emissions. Therefore, companies can 
choose among three alternatives: produce emissions within the legal requirements, buying 
emission allowances in the carbon market to compensate for excess pollution, or reducing 
emissions below the legal requirements and sell the excess allowances on the market (Czerny 
and Letmathe, 2016). The system is limiting greenhouse gas emissions from approximately 
11000 energy intensive installations in power generation and manufacturing industry sectors, 
regulating around 45% of total EU greenhouse gas emissions. Alrazi et al. (2016) analysed the 
quality of the CO2 emissions related disclosure and the overall environmental disclosure of 205 
electricity generation firms in 35 countries, finding that firms in countries with a high 
commitment towards the environment and a carbon emissions trading scheme are likely to 
disclose more comprehensive environmental information. Additionally, firms domiciled in the 
countries with an ETS have a greater proclivity to have their environmental information assured 
by a third party (Alrazi et al., 2016). Participation to the EU ETS system is mandatory for 
companies operating in the sectors covered, which are power and heat generation, energy-
intensive industry sectors including oil refineries, steel works and production of iron, 
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aluminium, metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids and bulk 
organic chemicals, and commercial aviation.  
I restricted the list of companies available on EU ETS companies Database selecting two sectors 
covered by the system: Power & Heat and Oil & Gas. The total number of companies available 
were 333 for Power and Heat and 128 for Oil & Gas. Among them I had to skim down the list 
in order to keep only the companies which provided environmental disclosure available in 
English either in their annual report either in a stand-alone report. To find whether companies 
were providing environmental disclosure I searched both on companies’ websites and on GRI 
Database3. The majority of the companies had to be excluded, either because no environmental 
information was available, either because information where available only in the local 
language. Among the remaining companies a portion has to be removed because no data about 
ESG performance, necessary as control variable to be included in the regression model, were 
available into Thomson Reuters ASSET44. The final sample, resulting after this procedure, 
encompasses 53 companies.  
Selecting companies subject to EU ETS Database is per se a criterion to select companies 
operating in environmentally sensitive industries. Additionally, considering Power & Heat and 
Oil & Gas as environmentally sensitive industries find support in the existing literature that has 
pointed out which industries should be considered environmentally sensitives: Cho and Patten 
(2007) defined as environmentally sensitive paper, chemical and allied products, petroleum 
refining, metals, mining and utilities; Kolk (2010) mentioned chemical and pharmaceutical, 
computer and electronics, automobiles, utilities, as traditionally high reporting sectors; 
Michelon et al. (2015) coded as environmentally sensitive industries chemical, mining, metals, 
paper, petroleum and utility. Analysing trends in reporting practices by sector, Kolk (2010) 
finds out that reporting has become a common practice for both Electric Utilities and Oil & Gas 
companies. 
I chose these two industries since they are both involved in energy production. Climate change 
and energy are closely interlinked, due to the fact that production and consumption of energy 
generated from fossil fuels substantially contributes to global warming. “Among the many 
human activities that that produce greenhouse gases, the use of energy represents by far the 
largest source of emission” (IEA, 2016). CO2 emissions form energy represent about 60% of 
global emissions. 
                                                 
3 http://database.globalreporting.org/search/ 
4 Environmental scores retrieved from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 will be used as control variable in the 
regression model 
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Figure 5: Estimated shares of global anthropogenic GHG 
Source: International Energy Agency (2016) 
 
 
Both the industries are involved in meeting growing energy demand around the world, while 
seeking to mitigate adverse impact of their activities and tackle the risk associated with climate 
changes. The more and more the entire world is concerned with the challenge of addressing 
climate change and reducing gas emission while ensuring economic growth and development. 
European Union signed three objectives for climate and energy policy, to be reached by 2020. 
The three objectives are reducing GHG emissions by at least 20 % compared with 1990 levels, 
increasing the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption to 20 %; and moving 
towards a 20 % increase in energy efficiency (Eurostat, 2017). In this scenario companies 
belonging to these two environmentally sensitive industries play a substantial role toward the 
goal of sustainable development. Accordingly, the practice of reporting on their environmental 
performance is a critical issue. For this reason, I believed focusing the scope of my research on 
these companies could have been of relevant interest.  
The sample of analysis included 53 companies from 16 different countries. The countries with 
the higher number of observation are UK (9 companies), Spain (8 companies), Italy (7 
companies) and France (7 companies). The number of companies for each country is displayed 
in the table below: 
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Table 6: Number of companies for each country 
 
 
For each company, environmental information referring to the year 2016, included either in a 
stand-alone report either in a specific section of the annual report, has been considered.  The 
majority of the document analysed are stand-alone reports (33 cases). The most common names 
of these reports are “Sustainability Report” (used 22 times) or “CSR Report” (used in 7 cases). 
Few companies provide different names:  one “Sustainable Development Report”, one 
“Environmental Report”, one “Our Responsibility” and one “Communication on Progress”. 
This last document makes explicit reference to the framework of reporting provided by the UN 
Global Compact since, as already said in the first chapter, Communication on Progress is the 
name of the document a company should use to inform stakeholders about its efforts in 
implementing the principles of the Global Compact. The remaining 20 companies disclose 
environmental information in the annual report or in an in an integrated report.  
The majority of the reports (38 and 72% of the total) refer to GRI guidelines. This evidence 
provides an empirical confirmation of the fact that GRI are the most used guidelines for 
sustainability reporting, which is an argument well rooted in the literature. The great majority 
refers to the G4 version of GRI guidelines, only three companies reports in accordance with the 
new version of GRI Standard. The table below shows the list of companies included in the 
sample and the name of the document analysed. 
Country Number of companies
Austria 2
Check Republic 1
Denmark 2
Finland 2
France 7
Germany 4
Grece 1
Italy 7
Netherlands 2
Norway 3
Poland 1
Portugal 2
Russia 1
Spain 8
Sweden 1
UK 9
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Table 7: List of the companies inside the sample of analysis and name of the document analysed  
Company Name Name of the document analyzed
A2A Integrated Report 2016
Acciona Sustainability Report 2016
Acea Sustainability Report 2016
Areva Reference Document 2016
Centrica Annual Report 2016
CEZ as Annual Report 2016
Dong Energy Sustainability Report 2016
Drax Power Annual Report 2016
Eon Sustainability Report 2016
EDF Annual Report 2016
Edison Sustainability Report 2016
EDP Energia De Portugal Annual Report 2016
Engie Registration Document 2016
Endesa Sustainability Report 2016
Enea CSR Report 2016
Enel Sustainability Report 2016
Fortum Sustainability Report 2016
Gas Natural Fenosa CSR Report 2016
Iberdrola Sustainability Report 2016
Linde CSR Report 2016
MVV Annual Report 2016
National Grid Environmental Report 2016
Red Electrica de espania CSR Report 2016
RWE Our Responsibility 2016
Scottish & Southern Energy Sustainability Report 2016
Terna Sustainability Report 2016
VESTAS WIND SYSTEMS Annual Report 2016
Veolia environnement Sustainability Report 2016
Verbund Integrated Report 2016
United Utilities Annual Report 2016
Total Registration Document 2016
Royal Dutch Shell Sustainability Report 2016
BP Sustainability Report 2016
ENI Sustainability Report 2016
REPSOL Sustainability Report 2016
STATOIL Sustainability Report 2016
Galp Energia Annual Report 2016
Gazprom Sustainable Development Report 2016
OMV Sustainability Report 2016
NESTE Annual Report 2016
Lundin Petroleum Sustainability Report 2016
Gamesa CSR Report 2016
SBM Offshore Annual Report 2016
Tullow Oil Annual Report 2016
Amec Foster Wheeler Sustainability Report 2016
TGS Nopec Geophysical Sustainability Report 2016
Petrofac Annual Report 2016
Hellenic Petrolemu CSR Report 2016
Rubis Annual Report 2016
SNAM Rete Gas Sustainability Report 2016
Akastor CSR Report 2016
CGG SA Communication on Progress 2016
Enagas Annual Report 2016
45 
 
Evidence on whether the report had been subject to external assurance has been gathered by 
searching for a specific statement of assurance on sustainability matters inside the report. In the 
cases where the document of analysis was an annual report, I have checked also whether the 
financial auditor provided any reference to assurance of the sustainability topics. This evidence 
gathered by digging into the documents has been reconciled with the information provided by 
the GRI Database on the caption External Assurance. 
The great majority of companies provide external assurance for their CSR information: 43 
companies out of 53 (81%) have their report assured by a third party. Among them, 35 are 
assured by a Big-4 (66% of the total) and 8 (15% of the total) by a different assurance provider. 
The companies that do not have their report assured are 10 (19% of the total). The chart below 
displays a graphical representation of this evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Trend on the practice of assurance within the sample of analysis 
 
 
This empirical finding is in line with the shared argument supported by the literature that the 
market of sustainability assurance is dominated by major accounting organization. 
Companies assured by a different assurance provider turned to accountants other than Big-4, 
consultants and engineering firms. Two companies have been assured by an accountant other 
than a Big-4: Rubis and Royal Dutch Shell. The assurance providers are Mazar SA in the former 
case and Loyd in the second. Three companies from UK (Scottish & Southern Energy, United 
Utilities and Amec Foster Wheeler) chose consultants: Corporate Citizen in two cases and 
Environmental Resources Management LTD in one. Two companies are assured by 
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engineering firms: National Grid has been assured by WSP Parsons Brinckerhoff and Hellenic 
Petrolemu by Tuv Austria Hellas. A peculiar case is the one of Grazprom which has been 
assured by RUIE (Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs).  
Among the report that are assured by a Big-4, 7 are assured by Deloitte, 11 by PWC, 13 by EY 
and 4 by KPMG. The chart below provides a graphical representation of the share of report 
assured by each Big-4 within the sample. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Share of report assured by each Big-4 within the sample of analysis 
 
 
In most of the cases the Big 4 that performed the sustainability assurance is the same that 
performed the financial auditing. An overlapping between the Big4 that provides financial 
auditing and sustainability assurance occurs in 31 cases (58% out of the total sample).  
The only case in which the assurance statement specifies a reasonable level of assurance is the 
one of the Sustainability Report of Royal Dutch Shell which is assured by Loyd. In the majority 
of the cases the assurance statement mentions a limited level of assurance (38 cases), while in 
few cases the level of assurance is not specified in the assurance statement (3 cases).  
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3.2 Content analysis  
This paragraph is aimed at describing how empirical evidence on the quality of environmental 
disclosure has been assessed through content analysis. According to Guthrie and Abeysekera 
(2006) content analysis “is a technique for gathering data. It involves codifying qualitative and 
quantitative information into pre-defined categories in order to derive patterns in the 
presentation and reporting of information.” (Guthrie and Abeysekera, p. 15, 2006). 
The application of the content analysis involves the choice of the framework used to classify 
information and the definition of the recording unit, which is the specific segment of content to 
be placed into a given category (Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006). The framework of analysis 
used in this research is based on GRI framework, which are the most recognised guidelines for 
sustainability disclosure. Since most of the companies included in the sample reported in 
accordance with the G4 version of GRI Guidelines, the framework of analysis has been based 
on this latter. The disclosure framework provided by GRI covers impact related to inputs (such 
as energy and water), outputs (such as emission effluents and waste) and other additional topics 
(as biodiversity, transport, and products and service-related impacts, as well as environmental 
compliance and expenditure). The table below reports the items of disclosure encompassed in 
the environmental section of GRI G4. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Disclosure framework provided by GRI G4 
 
Framework of disclosure
Emission
Effluents and Waste
Energy
Water
Biodiversity
Material
Suppliers environmental assessment
Compliance
Overall
Environmental Grievance Mechanism
Transport
Products and Services
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The topic of Material concerns information on the material used, such as the volume and the 
extent to which they will be recycled as input. Energy deals with the energy consumption and 
the extent to which an organization strive to reduce it. Water pertains to the volume of water 
withdrawn and the extent to which water is recycled or reused. Biodiversity deals with impact 
on natural sites and protected areas. Emission section includes indicators on greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission, divided by Scope 1, Scope 2 and Scope 3, as well as ozone-depleting 
substances NOx, SOx and other significant air emissions. Effluents and Waste category requires 
a company to report on its total waste by type and disposal method, on the total number and 
volume of significant spills, on waste deemed hazardous and on significant water discharges. 
Products and Services category deals with the environmental impact mitigation of products and 
services. Compliance is the section that deals with sanctions and fines for non-compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations. Transports concerns the significant environmental impact 
of transporting products, materials and members of the workforce. Overall section is the one 
dedicated to the disclosure of expenditures and investments for environmental protection. 
Supplier Environmental Assessment relates with the screening methods based on environmental 
criteria that are used to choose suppliers. Lastly, Environmental Grievance Mechanism refers 
to the formal grievance mechanism deployed to resolve grievances about environmental 
impacts.   
For each of these items I searched for information disclosed within the document analysed. I 
considered as recoding units sentences included in the narrative description and KPI included 
within table, assigning one point to each sentence or each KPI deemed relevant for a certain 
item of disclosure. The coding system I used tries to gather evidence on both quantity and 
quality of information, relying on the insight of Beretta and Bozzolan (2007), later adopted by 
Michlon et al. (2015) in the field of CRS disclosure, that quantity is not a sound proxy of quality 
of disclosure. This approach goes beyond the vast majority of researches conducted through 
content analysis that simply award a point in case a certain item is disclosed, failing to make a 
clear distinction between quality and quantity of disclosure. Michelon et al. (2015) proposed a 
framework that captures three different yet complementary dimensions: the content of the 
information disclosed, the type of information used to discuss CSR issues and the managerial 
orientation. Following this approach, I have developed a multidimensional framework aimed at 
gathering evidence on quantity and quality of environmental disclosure for each of the twelve 
items included in the framework of analysis. Coding information within this multidimensional 
framework allowed to measure the level of disclosure from three different perspectives: the 
amount of information provided, the type of these information, and the level of commitment 
they reflect. The three indexes used to measure disclosure are: quantity, type of information 
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(TOI) and managerial orientation (MAN). The former (Quantity) is aimed at measuring the 
amount of information provided counting the recording unit for each disclosure item included 
in the reporting framework reported in Table 8. A score of 1 is assigned to each sentence or 
each KPI deemed relevant for a certain item of disclosure. The second index (TOI) measures, 
for each item of environmental disclosure reported in Table 8, the incidence of recording units 
containing environmental information in quantitative term over the total of the recording units 
containing environmental information for that item. This index is aimed at measuring the 
incidence of recording unit which are deemed more significant because providing quantitative 
information over the total of the recording unit provided. The table below provides an example 
of qualitative and quantitative recording units retrieved from Enel Sustainability Report (2016): 
 
 
 
Table 9: Example of quantitative and qualitative sentences 
 
The third index (MAN) is constructed in a similar way to TOI, but focuses on the managerial 
orientation beyond each recording units instead that on the type of information. Specifically, 
MAN measures, for each item of sustainability disclosure in table 8, the incidence of recording 
units containing environmental information and showing a real commitment over the total of 
the recording units containing environmental information for that item. Following the approach 
of Michelon et al. (2015), a recording unit is considered showing a committed approach when 
it communicates results, in the case of backward looking information, and objectives, in the 
case of forward looking information. Conversely, information is considered showing a 
boilerplate approach if it describes initiatives and strategies, in the case of backward looking 
information, and expectations and hypothesis, in the case of forward looking information. Thus, 
the managerial orientation divides between committed and boilerplate approach as follows: 
 
Type of information Example of sentence
Qualitative
"The specific emissions fell in 2016 linked to the lower operation of the coal-
fired power plants and the removal from the scope of the plants of 
Slovenské elektrárne as from August 2016"
Quantitative
"In 2016 the direct emissions of CO2 equivalent (Scope 1), of 106.7 million 
tons, fell by 11% compared to 2015"
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Table 10: Managerial orientation: Committed vs Boilerplate approach 
Source: Michelon et al. (2015) 
 
The table below provides an example of information showing a committed approach and a 
boilerplate approach retrieved from Enel Sustainability Report (2016): 
 
 
 
Table 11: Example of sentences showing a committed approach and a boilerplate approach 
 
Fist the three indexes has been computed for each one of the 12 items of disclosure. The 
analytical formulation of three indexes is constructed as follows: 
• 𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑘 =  ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑛
𝑗=1  , where 𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑘 is the index of quantity of disclosure for 
company i in year t pertaining to the topic k. 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑘 is equal to 1 for each disclosure 
items referring to the topic k; 
• 𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑘 =  
∑ (𝑤∗𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑛
𝑗=1  
𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑘
, where w=0 if the information is qualitative and w=1 if the 
information is quantitative. 
• 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡𝑘 =  
∑ (𝑧∗𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑛
𝑗=1  
𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑘
, where z=0 if the information shows a boilerplate approach 
and z=1 if the information shows a committed approach. 
The first index (𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑘) is standardized dividing the score obtained by each company i for each 
item k by the maximum score obtained by a company n for that same item. Where n is the 
company that obtained the highest score for that item of disclosure k. Therefore, Quantity score 
is calculated as follows: 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘 =
𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 (𝑄𝑁𝑇𝑛𝑡𝑘)
  
Managerial Oreintation Example of sentence
Committed approach
"Over the years the reduction target for specific CO 2  emissions 
to 2020 has increased going from -18% to -25%"
Boilerplate approach
"Enel’s industrial activities contribute to the emission of carbon 
dioxide (CO2 ), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6 ) and methane (CH4 )"
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These procedure makes Quantity to vary between 0 and 100%, with the company providing the 
highest amount of information for a certain item scoring 100%. TOI and MAN are 
straightforwardly varying between 0 and 100% since they have been constructed as percentage. 
So that all the three indexes have the same scale. 
The figure below displays an example of the scores obtained by a subset of companies for the 
three indexes pertaining to the topic of Emission: 
 
 
 
Table 12: Examples of scores for a subset of companies pertaining to the topic of Emission 
 
The final indexes obtained by each company are the average of the indexes obtained for each 
of the twelves disclosure items. Being computed as average, also the final indexes ranges 
from 0% to 100%. The analytical formulation works as follows: 
• 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑘
∗ (∑ 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑘)
12
𝑘=1  
• 𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑘
∗ (∑ 𝑇𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑘)
12
𝑘=1  
• 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑘
∗ (∑ 𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡𝑘)
12
𝑘=1  
 
Coding information within these three indexes allowed to obtain a more comprehensive 
evaluation of the quality of disclosure based on three different but complementary dimension: 
the quantity of disclosure, the type of information and the managerial orientation.  
Company Name Emiss ion Quantity TOI MAN
Acciona 48% 39% 61%
Acea 34% 32% 32%
Centrica 22% 79% 86%
CEZ as 35% 22% 52%
Dong Energy 15% 40% 60%
EDF 31% 40% 60%
EDP Energia De Portugal 51% 79% 88%
Engie 31% 50% 60%
Endesa 66% 28% 30%
Enea 18% 67% 67%
Enel 82% 75% 79%
Fortum 69% 51% 60%
Gas Natural Fenosa 46% 60% 80%
Iberdrola 40% 69% 81%
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3.3 Empirical analysis 
This paragraph provides specification of the model that will be used to test the two hypotheses. 
The aim is to introduce all the variables that will be used in the regression which will be the 
subject matter of the next chapter.  
Recalling that hypothesis 1 was: 
H1: Firms with external assurance of their sustainability reports provide higher quality of 
environmental disclosure than firms with no assurance statement. 
The following model is adopted to test hypothesis 1: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽7 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 +  𝛽8 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜀 
 
Where Disclosure is equal to any one of the three indexes presented in the previous paragraph 
(Quantity, TOI, MAN). 
Assurance is the variable of interest in this study to test whether any difference in the indexes 
of disclosure can be linked with the presence of Assurance. Assurance is a binary variable coded 
as 1 for companies that assure their environmental disclosure and 0 for companies with 
unassured environmental information. Although the hypothesis has been formulated such that 
a positive association is expected between Assurance and Disclosure, the open debate existent 
in the literature, which has been analysed in depth in chapter two, renders not straightforward 
in predicting a positive sign in this relation.  
The regression model includes six other control variables: SR, Years, Size, Lev, ROA and 
Environmental score and Sector. 
SR is a binary variable coded as 1 if the company provides a stand-alone sustainability or CSR 
report and 0 if environmental information is included within the annual report or an integrated 
report. I included this variable in the model consistently with the model deployed by Michelon 
et al. (2015) and drawing on the insight that companies issuing a stand-alone report may provide 
more information. Accordingly, I expect a positive relation with the issue of a stand-alone report 
and disclosure Quantity while no clear expectation can be formulated for TOI and MAN. 
Years measures the number of years since which the company started to disclose CSR 
information. Years is used as control variable consistently with Moroney et al. (2009) analysis 
that found out a significant relation between the number of reports incorporating environmental 
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disclosure issued by a company and environmental disclosure. Evidence on the number of years 
since which a company started to disclose environmental information has been gathered either 
by checking the number of reports published on GRI Database, either by looking on the 
company website. A positive relation is expected between years and any of the three indexes 
since a company that has acquired more experience in the field is expected to disclose more and 
better information. 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization5. Company’s size has been 
found by the literature as one of the main determinant of disclosure and a control variable for 
size has been deployed by all models I have referred to (Michelon et al, 2015; Faisal et al, 2012; 
Moroney et al., 2009). I expect a positive relation between Size and Disclosure based on the 
argument that bigger companies have more means to disclose more. 
Lev is the leverage ratio5, measured as the ratio of long term debt divided by total asset. Similar 
studies have used leverage as control variable (Faisal et al, 2012; Moroney et al., 2009) based 
on the insight that further environmental disclosure reduce information asymmetry for 
debtholders. Therefore, a positive relation is expected between Lev and the three indexes. 
ROA is the return on asset4, measured as ratio of net income and total asset. Prior researchers 
have found a positive relation between ROA and Disclosure (Faisal et al, 2012; Moroney et al., 
2009), accordingly a positive relation is expected between those two variables also in my model.  
Environmental score has been measured as the average of three indexes gathered from 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 and is used as a proxy for environmental performance. The three 
indexes are Resource use score, Emission score and Environmental innovation score. They are 
measures of performance that range from 0 to 100%, with a higher score indicating a better 
environmental performance. Specifically: Resource use score reflects a company performance 
and capacity to reduce the use of materials, energy or water and to find more eco-efficient 
solutions by improving supply chain management; Emission score reflects the extent to which 
a company have a policy to improve emission reduction; Environmental innovation score 
reflects a company capacity to reduce the environmental costs and burden for its customers, 
and thereby creating new market opportunities through new environmental technologies and 
processors or eco designed products.6 According to Legitimacy Theory, there is a relationship 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure, however the mixed 
findings in the prior literature render me unable to hypothesize the sign of the relation.   
                                                 
5 Data retrieved from Eikon Database 
6 Descriptions of the three indexes has been retrieved from Eikon Database 
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Sector is a binary variable coded as one for companies belonging to Power & Heat industry and 
0 for companies belonging to Oil & Gas industries.  Usually researches that control for industry 
effect divide between sensitive and non-sensitive industries. In this case both industries are 
considered environmentally sensitive and thus highly reporting therefore a control variable for 
industry effect could have been omitted. However, I acknowledge that there might be different 
trends in disclosure between the two industries. Therefore, I have opted for the introduction of 
Sector as a control variable. 
For testing the hypothesis 2 the sample will be sized down by removing companies without 
assurance and the variable Assurance will be replaced with Big4, which is the new variable of 
interest for the test of the second hypothesis, recalling that hypothesis 2 was: 
H2: Firms that choose a Big-4 as assuror provide higher quality of environmental disclosure 
than firms that choose other assurance providers. 
The following model is adopted to test hypothesis two: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑂𝐴
+  𝛽7 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜀 
 
Big 4, which is a binary variable coded as 1 if the assurance provider is a Big-4 and 0 if not. A 
reasoning similar to the one made for the variable Assurance holds for Big 4: the hypothesis 
has been framed such that a positive relation is expected between Big 4 and Disclosure, however 
the existing criticisms on the role played by Big-4 in performing sustainability assurance made 
difficult to define expectations about this relation. 
All the other variables are the same deployed for hypothesis one. The table below summarizes 
the variables included in the model to test the two hypotheses: 
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Table 13: Variables included in the model 
  
Variable Name Description
Dependent variable Disclosure Any one of the three disclosure indexes (Quantity, TOI, MAN)
Assurance
Binary variable coded as 1 for companies that assure their SR and 
0 otherwise
Big 4
Binary variable coded as 1 if the assurance provider is a Big-4 and 
0 if an assuror different form a Big-4 is chosen
SR
Binary variable coded as 1 if the company issue a stand alone 
report for CSR disclosure and 0 if information are included in the 
annual report or in an integrated report
Years
Number of years since which the company started to disclose CSR 
information
Size
Natural logarithm of market capitalization is used as a proxy of 
size
Lev Leverage ratio measured as total long term debt to total asset
ROA Return on asset
Environmental score
Control variable for environmental performance measured as 
average of Resource use score, Emission score and Environmental 
innovation score
Sector
Binary variable coded as 1 for Power & Heat and as 0 for Oil & 
Gas.
Independent variables
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4. Results  
This chapter is aimed at analysing the results obtained. The first paragraph presents descriptive 
statistics of the variables included in the data set. The second paragraph is devoted to the testing 
of hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 using the multivariate regression model. The third paragraph 
provides additional analysis addressing some concerns about the model used. The chapter ends 
with a comparison between the results I have obtained and the results of similar researches 
existent in the literature, analysing to what extent my analysis has confirmed previous findings 
and to what extent it has come up with new results.  
 
 
4.1 Descriptive results 
The dataset constructed encompasses the three indexes used to measure disclosure (Quantity, 
TOI, MAN), the two variables of interest (Assurance and Big4) and the other seven control 
variables (Size, Lev, Years, ROA, Environmental Score, SR and Sector). The table below 
summarizes descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the dataset with exception of 
the dummy variables. 
 
 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the dataset 
 
Quantity index range from 58% of Iberdrola to 1% of TGS, with an average score of 18%. For 
both TOI and MAN, the highest score has been achieved by Edison (59% for TOI and 65% for 
MAN). This means that almost 60% of the information provided are quantitative and more than 
60% communicate objectives or results. The lowest scores have been achieved by TGS Nopec 
(0%) which provided only qualitative information and without a committed approach. The 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Quantity 0,18 0,14 0,01 0,58
TOI 0,27 0,14 0,00 0,59
MAN 0,29 0,15 0,00 0,65
Size 22,81 1,58 18,38 25,86
Lev 0,25 0,16 0,00 0,78
Years 9,72 4,45 1,00 18,00
ROA 0,02 0,05 -0,12 0,13
Env. Score 74,62 14,08 24,11 95,00
Number of companies 53
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average score for TOI is 27%, for MAN it is 29%. A table displaying the three scores obtained 
by each company in the sample is included in the Appendix. 
The only topic for which all the companies in the sample provide information is Emission. This 
is consistent with the fact that companies have been selected because of their subjection to the 
EU ETS and, therefore, Emission should be a material topic for them. The only company that 
report on all the topics is Iberdrola. On average companies reports on 6,3 topics. Assured 
companies seem to report on more topics comparing to the unassured: on average, assured 
companies report on 6,8 tropics, while unassured only on 4,3. It is also evident that the average 
scores obtained by the group of companies with assurance are higher than the ones of unassured 
companies. The average scores obtained by the group of companies with assurance are 21% for 
Quantity, 29% for TOI and 31% for MAN. Conversely, the group of unassured companies 
scored, on average, 6% for Quantity, 18% for TOI and 21% for MAN. The level of confidence 
at which the mean values obtained by the two groups can be considered significantly different 
has been assessed through hypothesis testing. The same analysis has been extended to all the 
other variables included in the model in order to analyse different features between the group 
of companies with assurance and the group of companies without. 
Since t-test can be performed only for normally distributed variables, a preliminary test for 
distribution has been conducted for all the variables. The hypothesis of normal distribution has 
been tested with the Skewness/Kurtosis test. The variables that can be assumed normally 
distributed at a level of significance of 5% are: are TOI, MAN, Size and Years. For the variables 
that can be considered normally distributed, the t-test has been performed. For the other 
variables, which cannot be assumed normal, I opted for he Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. No 
test has been performed on the dummy variables SR and Sector. The table below shows the 
results obtained from the Skewness/Kurtosis test: 
 
 
Table 15: Results of the Skewness/Kurtosis test 
Skewness Kurtosis p-value
Quantity 0,004 0,401 0,021
TOI 0,620 0,164   0,317*
MAN 0,556 0,548   0,694*
Size 0,044 0,272   0,077*
Lev 0,001 0,058 0,004
Years 0,515 0,078   0,153*
ROA 0,014 0,066 0,016
Env. Score 0,001 0,026 0,002
Number of companies 53
* variables that can be condidered normally distributed  at a level of signifiicance of 5%
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The evidence resulting from the t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is that all variables but 
Lev are significantly different for the group of assured and unassured companies. Quantity 
scores higher for the assured group at a level of significant of 1% (p-value 0,000) while the 
other two indexes (TOI and MAN) are higher for the group with assurance at a level of 
significance of 5%. The hypothesis testing would allow to conclude with a certain level of 
reliability that assured companies do provide more information, while more cautious conclusion 
should be drawn for the type of information provided and the managerial orientation, although 
the difference recoded by the scores in the two groups is significant also in these cases. These 
results provide preliminary insight for hypothesis 1 but, a more meaningful test will be 
performed with the multivariate regression model controlling for the other variables.  
Concerning the control variables, a significant difference is reported for Years (p-value 0,000) 
meaning that on average assured companies have been disclosing environmental information 
for a significantly higher number of years (10,67 years) comparing to unassured companies 
(5,60 years). Other significant differences are for Size, ROA and for Environmental Score. This 
means that, on average, assured companies have a higher market capitalization than unassured 
ones: the mean of the natural logarithm of market capitalization is 23,01 for the former group 
and 21,95 for the latter. As far as ROA is concerned, it is interesting to notice that the average 
value is positive for the assured group (2%) and negative for the unassured group (-1%). The 
group of assured companies scores better also in terms of environmental performance (77% vs 
63%). No significant defence emerges for Lev, meaning that the two groups are comparable in 
term of financial structure.   
The table below summarizes the mean and standard deviation values for each variable and the 
t-statistic/z-statistic7 and p-value for hypothesis testing: 
 
 
                                                 
7 Stata report the t-statistic for the t-test and the z-statistic for the and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 
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Table 16: Hypothesis testing of the difference between the two groups means 
 
 
No one of the two tests has been performed for the dummy variable SR. Since I believe it is 
interesting to analyse the dynamics existent between the CSR practice of issuing a stand-alone 
report and that of assuring sustainability information, some specific analysis has been 
performed to study the relation between SR and Assurance. The overlap between Assurance 
and SR is present in 27 cases, which represent 51% of the total observation. The cases of annual 
report/integrated report with assurance on CSR information are 16 (30% of the total). The cases 
of lack of assurance statement have been recorded 6 times for standalone reports and 4 times 
for annual report/integrated (respectively 11% and 8% of the total observations). The following 
table displays the frequencies of occurrences of the two variables:   
 
 
 
Table 17: Frequency tabulation of SR and Assurance 
 
Analogous analysis has been performed for the two groups of companies that chose a Big4 as 
assurance provider (Big4=1) and companies that chose a different assurance provider (Big4=0). 
First, the hypothesis of normality has been retested for all the variables after sizing down the 
sample by removing the unassured companies. The hypothesis of normal distribution does still 
hold for TOI, MAN and Years, while this time is rejected for Size (p-value = 0,012). Lev and 
Environmental Score can be assumed normal at a level of significance of 5%. The table below 
No SR 4 8% 16 30% 20 38%
SR 6 11% 27 51% 33 62%
Total 10 19% 43 81% 53 100%
No Assurance Assurance Total
61 
 
shows the results obtained from the Skewness/Kurtosis test performed for the sample of 
companies with assurance: 
 
 
 
Table 18: Results of the Skewness/Kurtosis test performed for companies with Assurance =1 
 
Accordingly, the t-test has been performed on TOI, MAN, Lev, Years and Environmental Score, 
while the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test has been chosen for Quantity, Size, and ROA.  
Hypothesis testing shows no significant difference for Quantity score between the two groups 
(p-value > 0,1), meaning that no significant differences in term of amount of information 
provided emerges between the two groups. Conversely, a significant difference emerges for 
TOI and MAN scores: on an average, companies assured by a Big4 score 32% for TOI and 34% 
for MAN, while companies assured by a different provider score 16% for TOI and 20% for 
MAN. This means that the incidence of recording unit containing environmental information 
and expressed in quantitative terms over the total of the recording units containing 
environmental information and the incidence of recording units containing environmental 
information and showing a committed approach over the total of the recording units containing 
environmental information tend to be higher for companies assured by a Big4. The difference 
of the scores between the two groups is significant at a level of 1% for TOI (p-value = 0,004) 
and at 5% for MAN (p-value = 0,014). Other significant difference is reported for Years (p-
value = 0,057). On average, companies assured by a Big-4 have been disclosing CSR 
information for the last 11,23 years, while companies that chose other assurance providers only 
for 8,25 years. The last variable significantly different between the two groups is Environmental 
Score (p-value = 0,080), with a higher average score for companies assured by a provider other 
than Big4 (83% vs 76%). For the other variables, no significant differences emerge between 
the two groups of companies. This means that these two groups are similar in term of financial 
measures (Size, Lev, ROA).  
Skewness Kurtosis p-value
Quantity 0,027 0,674 0,083
TOI 0,785 0,311   0,561*
MAN 0,698 0,740   0,878*
Size 0,011 0,049 0,012
Lev 0,023 0,523   0,068*
Years 0,455 0,405   0,517*
ROA 0,030 0,027 0,016
Env. Score 0,074 0,679   0,165*
Number of companies 43
* variables that can be condidered normally distributed  at a level of signifiicance of 5%
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The table below displays means and standard deviation for all the variables divided by the two 
groups and the t-statistics/z-statistics and p-values for hypothesis testing: 
 
 
Table 19: Hypothesis testing of the difference between the two groups means 
 
 
The subsequent step of my analysis has been to examine the relation existing between the 
variables included in the model. This analysis has been performed by computing Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients. The Table below represent the matrix with the correlation coefficients 
for the variables used to test hypothesis 1. 
 
 
Table 20: Pearson correlation coefficients for variables included in H1 
 
Assurance is positively correlated with all the disclosure indexes, as expected. Correlation 
coefficients are respectively 43% with Quantity, 30% with TOI and 27% with MAN. Other 
variables with a significant positive correlation with the indexes of disclosure are SR, Years, 
Variable p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Quantity 0,23 0,01 0,14 0,07 -1,37 0,169
TOI 0,32 0,13 0,16 0,11 -3,04       0,004***
MAN 0,34 0,14 0,20 0,13 -2,56     0,014**
Size 22,96 1,57 23,23 1,58 0,16 0,876
Lev 0,24 0,14 0,32 0,19 1,42 0,163
Years 11,23 3,66 8,25 4,80 -1,96   0,057*
ROA 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,05 1,12 0,261
Env. Score 0,76 0,11 0,83 0,11 1,79   0,080*
Big-4 Other assurance provider t-statistic/ z-
statistic
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
n=35 n=8
Quantity TOI MANAssurance SR Size Lev Years ROA Env. Score Sector
Quantity 1,00
TOI 1,00
MAN 1,00
Assurance 0,43 0,30 0,27 1,00
SR 0,36 0,17 0,22 0,02 1,00
Size 0,39 -0,03 0,02 0,27 0,11 1,00
Lev 0,01 -0,07 -0,05 0,00 0,00 0,04 1,00
Years 0,48 0,45 0,42 0,45 0,29 0,45 0,03 1,00
ROA 0,07 0,01 0,01 0,26 0,26 0,39 0,00 0,11 1,00
Env. Score 0,20 0,18 0,13 0,39 0,13 0,36 0,01 0,45 0,05 1,00
Sector 0,26 0,06 0,11 0,06 -0,05 0,06 0,06 -0,05 0,03 -0,02 1,00
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and Environmental Score. Size and Sector are positively correlated only with Quantity and not 
with the two other indexes.  
Concerning correlation among control variables, a positive correlation has been found between 
Assurance and Size (27%), meaning that bigger companies are more likely to have their report 
assured. Assurance is also positively correlated with Years (45%) meaning that companies that 
have acquired more years of experience in CSR reporting are more likely to have their report 
assured. Lastly, Assurance is positively correlated both with environmental performance (the 
correlation coefficient with Environmental Score is 39%) and financial performance (the 
correlation coefficient with ROA is 26%). Years is also positively correlated with SR (29%) and 
Size (45%) meaning that companies that have been disclosing CSR information for a longer 
period of time tend to be bigger and to issue a stand-alone report dedicated to CSR topics.   
Correlations coefficients has been computed also to provide an early indication of 
multicollinearity concerns. However, no correlation index among the independent variables is 
too high to represent a potential threat of multicollinearity. 
Correlation coefficients has been computed also for variables involved for the test of hypothesis 
2. The correlation matrix is reported below: 
 
 
Table 21: Pearson correlation coefficients for variables included in H2 
 
Big4 is positively correlated with all the three indexes. The highest correlation is recorded for 
TOI (43%), the lowest for Quantity (24%). After removing companies without assurance form 
the sample SR, Years are still positively correlated with all the three indexes, while the 
correlation for Environmental Score with the indexes of disclosure is much lower in this case. 
Size and Sector are again positively correlated only with Quantity and not with the two other 
indexes. Big4 is also positively correlated with years (29%). Conversely, it is negatively 
Quantity TOI MAN Big4 SR Size Lev Years ROA Env. Score Sector
Quantity 1,00
TOI 1,00
MAN 1,00
Big4 0,24 0,43 0,37 1,00
SR 0,47 0,28 0,37 -0,12 1,00
Size 0,33 -0,17 -0,11 0,07 0,18 1,00
Lev -0,03 -0,19 -0,19 -0,22 -0,01 0,14 1,00
Years 0,41 0,39 0,38 0,29 0,37 0,39 0,04 1,00
ROA -0,05 0,01 0,00 -0,04 -0,35 0,27 0,27 -0,10 1,00
Env. Score 0,07 0,03 0,02 -0,27 0,26 0,30 0,30 0,04 -0,06 1,00
Sector 0,27 0,05 0,09 0,20 -0,07 -0,11 0,15 -0,18 0,14 -0,37 1,00
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correlated with Environmental Score (-27%) and Lev (-22%). Also in this case no correlation 
coefficient among the independent variables seems to be too high to represent a potential threat 
of multicollinearity. 
   
 
 
4.2 Multivariate results 
This paragraph exposes the results obtained with the multiple regression model. First, the 
regressions will be used to test hypothesis 1: one regression will be performed for each of the 
three disclosure indexes focusing on the variable of interest Assurance. The sign and the 
significance of Assurance will be investigated to make inference on the relation between 
external assurance and disclosure. Then, the same approach will be followed for the test of 
hypothesis 2, considering only the companies with assurance and focusing on the variable Big4 
to verify whether, given that the company has purchased an assurance service, choosing one of 
the major accountancy organization has a positive influence on the three measures of disclosure. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
First, the regression model is used to test hypothesis 1 using Quality as dependent variable to 
measure the disclosure. The results obtained show that Assurance has a positive and significant 
(p-value = 0,025) association with Quantity, meaning that companies that have their report 
assured by a third party provide more information at a confidence level of 5%. Other significant 
variables are SR, Size and Sector. As expected the amount of information provided is positively 
associated with the choice of issuing a stand-alone report dedicated to CSR topics and with 
company size, in the sense that bigger companies disclose more information. Sector is 
positively associated with Quantity, meaning that companies operating in the Power & Heat 
industry provide more information than companies operating in Oil & Gas.   
Multicollinearity analysis has been performed computing the variance inflation factor (VIF): 
VIF range from 1, 01 of Lev to 1,69 of Years, therefore multicollinearity is not a concern.8 
The table below summarize the results obtained from the first regression displaying the 
regression coefficient, the t-statistic, the p-value and the VIF. 
 
                                                 
8 A VIF value above 10 is usually considered a threshold above which multicollinearity represent a problem 
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Table 22: First regression for  H1 
 
Different results are obtained when using TOI as dependent variable. Assurance is not 
significant when looking at the type of information provided (p-value > 0,1). In this case 
significant variables are Size and Years. However, the relation with Size works in the opposite 
direction in this case, showing that bigger companies disclose lower incidence of recording 
units containing environmental information expressed in quantitative terms over the total of the 
recording unit containing environmental information. Years has a positive relation with TOI at 
a level of significance of 1% providing evidence that companies that disclose environmental 
information since more time have acquired more expertise in providing better quality of 
information measured by the type of information. The results of this second regression are 
reported in the table below. 
 
 
Table 23: Second regression for H1 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept -0,48 -1,92 0,061
Assurance 0,11 2,31     0,025** 1,44
SR 0,07 2,12     0,040** 1,22
Size 0,02 1,80   0,078* 1,56
Lev 0,02 -0,18 0,861 1,01
Years 0,01 1,56 0,126 1,69
ROA 0,36 -0,98 0,333 1,48
Environmental score -0,07 -0,53 0,597 1,50
Sector 0,07 2,26     0,029** 1,16
R² 47%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Quantity
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 0,71 2,35 0,023
Assurance 0,05 0,90 0,374 1,44
SR 0,02 0,50 0,623 1,22
Size -0,03 -2,05     0,046** 1,56
Lev -0,07 -0,61 0,543 1,01
Years 0,02 3,10       0,003*** 1,69
ROA 0,10 0,23 0,822 1,48
Environmental score 0,02 0,15 0,881 1,50
Sector 0,03 0,71 0,480 1,16
R² 31%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Type of information
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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Similar reasoning holds when using MAN as dependent variable. No significant relation 
emerges between Assurance and managerial orientation (p-value > 0,1). The only significant 
variable is Years, so that companies that acquired more years of experience over CSR reporting 
tend to communicate more recording units containing environmental information showing a 
committed approach over the total amount of recording units containing environmental 
information. The table below displays the results obtained for the regression of hypothesis 1 
using MAN as dependent variable. 
 
 
Table 24: Third regression for H1 
 
Overall, the results obtained by these three regressions provided confirmation for the hypothesis 
1 only when Quantity index is used. Conversely, no significant evidence has been obtained for 
any of the other indexes. Accordingly, there is an association between the decision to have 
sustainability information assured by a third party and a commitment to disclose more 
environmental information, but, given that amount of information, neither the type of 
information nor the managerial orientation seem to be related with Assurance.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
After sizing down the sample of companies by taking off those without assurance, hypothesis 
2 has been tested by removing the variable Assurance and introducing Big4. The regression 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 0,61 1,88 0,067
Assurance 0,05 0,78 0,439 1,44
SR 0,04 0,91 0,369 1,22
Size -0,02 -1,46 0,152 1,56
Lev -0,06 -0,51 0,611 1,01
Years 0,02 2,68      0,010*** 1,69
ROA 0,07 0,14 0,879 1,48
Environmental score -0,03 -0,15 0,879 1,50
Sector 0,04 0,98 0,332 1,16
R² 26%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Managerial orientation
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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model has been run again to investigate the sign and the significance of Big4 on the three 
indexes of disclosure. 
When Quantity is used as dependent variable no significant impact of the variable Big4 
emerges. The sign of the relation is positive but cannot be considered statistically significant 
(p-value > 0,1). Consistently with the regression performed on Quantity with the entire sample 
of companies, significant positive relations are detected for the variables SR and Sector, which 
are both significant at 5%. Conversely, after removing form the sample the companies without 
assurance, this hypothesis of significance for Size is rejected even at a level of 10% (p = 0,107). 
 
 
Table 25: First regression for H2 
 
Different evidence emerges when looking at the type of information: in this case Big4 is 
positively associated with TOI with a level of significant of 5%. Consistently with the results 
obtained for hypothesis 1 when looking at TOI, other significant variables are Size and Years, 
the former with a negative sign, the latte with a positive sign. New variables that emerge with 
a significant and positive relation are SR and ROA. In the regression performed with the whole 
sample they were positively associated with TOI but not significant, while in this case they are 
both significant at a level of 5%. Accordingly, the choice of issuing a stand-alone report does 
not only have an impact in enhancing the Quantity of disclosure, as emerged by previous 
regressions, but also in enhancing the type of information. Lastly, a better profitability, 
measured by ROA, seems to have a positive association with TOI. 
 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept -0,52 -1,69 0,100
Big4 0,06 1,15 0,256 1,59
SR 0,11 2,67    0,012** 1,49
Size 0,02 1,66 0,107 1,45
Lev -0,08 -0,63 0,530 1,16
Years 0,01 0,95 0,315 1,92
ROA 0,03 0,06 0,949 1,38
Environmental score 0,02 0,09 0,926 1,52
Sector 0,09 2,32    0,026** 1,31
R² 47%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Quantity
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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Table 26: Second regression for H2 
 
 
Analogous results emerge for managerial orientation. Big4 is positively related also with MAN, 
but at a level of significance of only 10%.  Size has a negative relation with MAN at a level of 
significance of 5%. Significant positive relations are detected for SR, Years and ROA. Similarly, 
to the results obtained for TOI, empirical evidence shows that the quality of information 
measured by managerial orientation, is enhanced by the choice of issuing a standalone report, 
the number of years of experience a company has in CSR reporting and the company 
profitability. 
 
 
 
Table 27: Third regression for H2 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 0,82 2,96 0,011
Big4 0,12 2,28     0,029** 1,59
SR 0,11 2,51     0,017** 1,49
Size -0,04 -2,99       0,005*** 1,45
Lev -0,11 -0,95 0,348 1,16
Years 0,01 1,97   0,057* 1,92
ROA 0,99 2,26     0,030** 1,38
Environmental score 0,11 0,57 0,574 1,52
Sector 0,01 0,15 0,884 1,31
R² 49%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Type of information
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 0,75 2,22 0,033
Big4 0,11 1,76   0,088* 1,59
SR 0,13 2,76      0,009*** 1,49
Size -0,03 -2,30    0,027** 1,45
Lev -0,15 -1,11 0,275 1,16
Years 0,01 1,77   0,086* 1,92
ROA 0,99 2,04    0,049** 1,38
Environmental score 0,06 0,28 0,783 1,52
Sector 0,02 0,55 0,583 1,31
R² 45%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Managerial orientation
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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Overall, hypothesis 2 is confirmed when looking at TOI and MAN, while it is not when looking 
at Quantity. Therefore, given that companies with assurance disclose more information, it 
seems not to be relevant whether the assurance has been performed by a Big4 or not. 
Conversely, when looking at the two other measures, it is not sufficient that the companies has 
an external assurance, rather it seems to be relevant whether the assuror is a Big4. The choice 
of a Big4 has a significant relation with the type of information provided, to the extent that 
companies assured by a Big4, on average, provide more environmental information expressed 
in quantitative terms over the total environmental information they disclose. With a weaker 
level of significance, it seems also that companies assured by a Big4 provide more 
environmental information showing a real commitment over the total environmental 
information disclosed. 
 
 
 
4.3 Additional analysis 
This paragraph addresses some concerns which may arise pertaining to the model presented in 
the previous paragraph. Some additional analysis have been run with the aim to test the validity 
of the results obtained when changing some assumptions. 
 
Materiality concerns: 
One concern of this study may be the fact that it is not considering what information is material 
for the stakeholders. Specifically, computing the final scores as an average of the scores 
obtained for each topics of disclosure ignores the fact that some items of disclosure may be 
more material than others. A sound definition of materiality would involve a process of 
stakeholder interview which was not inside the boundaries of my research. To address this 
concern, I have used as a proxy of materiality the number of companies inside the sample 
reporting on a certain topic. This reasoning is based on the idea that if a lot of companies are 
reporting on a certain item it means that this item could be considered material. To choose 
which items could be deemed more material, I have ranked the items of disclosure based on the 
number of companies that report on that item. The table below shows the ranking of the 
disclosure items:  
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Table 28: Ranking of the items of disclosure by number of companies that report on that topic 
 
I decided to select as more material topics the first four items: Emission, Effluents and Waste, 
Energy and Water. For these four topics, at least the 80% of the companies included in the 
sample is providing some information. I computed the overall scores for Quantity, TOI and 
MAN as average of the scores obtained for these four items and I run again the regression 
analysis with these new indexes as dependent variables. 
In this case Quantity ranges from a maximum of 80% obtained by Endesa to a minimum of 2% 
of TGS Nopec Geophysical, with an average score of 31%. For TOI and MAN, the lowest scores 
(0%) have been obtained by TGS Nopec Geophysical which did not provide any quantitative 
nor committed information for the topics considered. The highest score has been obtained by 
Tullow Oil for both index (100%). The average score is 47% for TOI and 52% for MAN. The 
following table displays descriptive statistics for the three variables computed as average of the 
four material topics:  
 
 
 
Table 29: Descriptive statistic for disclosure scores based on material topics 
 
Intem of disclosure
Number of companies 
reporting on that topic
Emission 53
Effluents and Waste 47
Energy 45
Water 42
Biodiversity 38
Material 22
Suppliers environmental assessment 19
Compliance 19
Overall 18
Environmental Grievance Mechanism 14
Transport 10
Products and Services 8
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Quantity 0,31 0,18 0,02 0,80
TOI 0,47 0,21 0,00 1,00
MAN 0,52 0,21 0,00 1,00
Number of companies 53
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A table with the scores obtained by each company for the three indexes when limiting the 
analysis to material topics is included in the Appendix. 
The results for hypothesis 1 are consistent with the ones presented in the previous paragraph 
when weighting all the twelve disclosure items: Assurance is significant when looking at 
Quantity, while it is not for the other two indexes.  
The table below shows that Assurance is highly significant when considering Quantity (p-value 
= 0,007). Also the significant positive effect of Size detected in the main model is confirmed. 
Conversely neither SR, nor Sector seems to have a significant role in enhancing Quantity. 
Accordingly, no significant difference in terms of amount of information disclosed emerges 
between companies that issues a standalone report and companies that include environmental 
information within the annual report. Moreover, companies operating in Power & Heat sector 
and those operating in Oil & Gas do not show significant differences for the quantity of 
information disclosed concerning Emission, Effluents and Waste, Energy and Water.  
 
 
Table 30 First regression for H1 focusing only on material topics 
 
Assurance is not significant neither on TOI nor on MAN (p-value >0,1). Moreover, this analysis 
confirms the high positive significance of the number of years of experience a company has in 
CSR reporting in determining higher score for both TOI and MAN. Also the weak negative 
effect of Size on TOI is still present confirming the previous evidence that bigger companies 
tend to disclose a lower incidence of environmental information expressed in quantitative terms 
over the total amount of environmental information. The two following tables reports the 
outputs of the two regressions. 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept -0,59 -1,72 0,093
Assurance 0,18 2,81      0,007*** 1,44
SR 0,06 1,36 0,181 1,22
Size 0,04 2,17    0,036** 1,56
Lev -0,08 -0,64 0,529 1,01
Years 0,01 1,62 0,112 1,69
ROA -0,55 -1,29 0,202 1,48
Environmental score -0,23 -1,29 0,202 1,50
Sector 0,03 0,64 0,526 1,16
R² 44%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Quantity
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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Table 31: Second regression for H1 focusing only on material topics 
 
 
 
 
Table 32: Third regression for H1 focusing only on material topics 
 
 
Conversely, different results have been obtained for hypothesis 2: Big4 is still not significant 
on Quantity, but, when limiting the scope of analysis to material topics, Big4 is also not 
significant on TOI and MAN.  This evidence suggest that more cautious conclusion should be 
drown on the role played by Big4 in enhancing the quality of environmental disclosure.  
For Quantity, significant role is played by SR as it was in the main model used for H2, while 
the effect of Size is more significant than it was in that case. Conversely, the effect of Sector 
drops when limiting the scope of analysis to more material topics. This confirm the evidence 
obtained from the test of H1 on material topics that companies operating in Power & Heat sector 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 1,21 2,76 0,008
Assurance 0,10 1,28 0,207 1,44
SR -0,05 -0,87 0,389 1,22
Size -0,04 -1,89   0,065* 1,56
Lev 0,01 0,05 0,960 1,01
Years 0,02 3,09       0,003*** 1,69
ROA 0,06 0,1 0,922 1,48
Environmental score -0,12 -0,52 0,605 1,50
Sector -0,06 -1,12 0,267 1,16
R² 30%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Type of information
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 1,18 2,58 0,013
Assurance 0,08 1,00 0,324 1,44
SR -0,03 -0,51 0,610 1,22
Size -0,04 -1,61 0,115 1,56
Lev -0,03 -0,15 0,878 1,01
Years 0,02 2,77      0,008*** 1,69
ROA 0,16 0,24 0,814 1,48
Environmental score -0,12 -0,52 0,607 1,50
Sector -0,05 -0,83 0,409 1,16
R² 24%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Managerial orientation
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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and those operating in Oil & Gas sector do not show significant differences in term of amount 
of information provided pertaining to Emission, Effluents and Waste, Energy and Water. 
Accordingly, the higher quantity of information disclosed by companies in Power & Heat sector 
seems to be attributable to the other topics, which have not been deemed material for the 
purpose of this analysis.  
 
 
Table 33: First regression for H2 focusing only on material topics 
 
 
Big4 has still a positive relation with the scores on TOI and MAN but it is not significant in none 
of the two cases. Accordingly, it seems that companies assured by a Big4 obtain better scores 
for TOI and MAN when looking at a broader range of topics, but not when limiting the analysis 
to a subsample of selected topics. The only variable which has a significant effect in this case 
is Size, whose relationship with TOI and MAN works with a negative direction. 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept -0,41 -0,94 0,355
Big4 0,02 0,21 0,832 1,59
SR 0,11 1,77   0,086* 1,49
Size 0,03 1,86   0,072* 1,45
Lev -0,21 -1,18 0,245 1,16
Years 0,01 1,30 0,204 1,92
ROA -1,15 -0,23 0,817 1,38
Environmental score -0,27 -0,98 0,332 1,52
Sector 0,04 0,80 0,430 1,31
R² 36%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Quantity
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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Table 34: Second regression for H2 focusing only on material topics 
 
 
 
Table 35: Third regression for H2 focusing only on material topics 
 
 
Overall, the analysis addressing material topics strengthened hypothesis 1 while does not 
support hypothesis 2. In light of this analysis it can be reasonably concluded that, on average, 
companies that have their reports assured provide more information, no matter who performed 
the assurance. Conversely the fact that the report has been subject to external assurance seems 
not to be sufficient to explain a better quality of information measured by type of information 
and managerial orientation. What is seems to have a certain relevance on the quality of 
information is who performed the assurance. Empirical evidence shows that companies that 
chose a Big4 assurance provider disclose more environmental information in quantitative terms 
and more environmental information expressing a committed approach over the total 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 1,21 2,57 0,015
Big4 0,12 1,37 0,179 1,59
SR 0,05 0,74 0,465 1,49
Size -0,04 -2,02   0,052* 1,45
Lev -0,19 -1,00 0,322 1,16
Years 0,01 1,34 0,188 1,92
ROA 1,06 1,57 0,126 1,38
Environmental score 0,05 0,18 0,860 1,52
Sector -0,07 -1,18 0,247 1,31
R² 29%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Type of information
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 1,14 2,35 0,025
Big4 0,11 1,25 0,219 1,59
SR 0,07 1,11 0,273 1,49
Size -0,04 -1,87   0,070* 1,45
Lev -0,24 -1,24 0,222 1,16
Years 0,01 1,11 0,275 1,92
ROA 1,10 1,59 0,122 1,38
Environmental score 0,17 0,57 0,575 1,52
Sector -0,06 -0,93 0,361 1,31
R² 28%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Managerial orientation
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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environmental information disclosed overall. However, when looking only at Emission, 
Effluents and Waste, Energy and Water, there is no significant evidence that companies assured 
by a Big4 score better in term of TOI and MAN. Accordingly, when limiting the analysis to 
material topics, no significant differences for companies assured by a Big4 and companies 
assured by a different provider emerges in term of type of information and of managerial 
orientation. 
 
 
Robustness check 
I acknowledge that my model may suffer from heteroskedasticity meaning that the size of the 
error term may not be constant across the values of the independent variable. In this case the 
standard errors of the estimates would be biased. To mitigate this concern, I re-run the 
regressions estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. When performing 
regression with robust standard error, t-statistics and p-values are subject to some slight 
changes. What I am interested in is the level of significance of my variables of study (Assurance 
and Big4) when controlling for heteroscedasticity.  
After performing this additional analysis, it turns out the Assurance is still significant on 
Quantity. The level of significance is 5% (p-value = 0,022) when using the overall score and 
1% (p-value = 0,004) when using the score for material topics. Assurance is still not significant 
for type of information and managerial orientation. Big 4 is still significant at a level of 5% for 
both TOI and MAN while it is not for Quantity. Moreover, Big4 remains significant, although 
only at 10% level, on TOI when limiting the scope of analysis to material topics, while is still 
not significant for MAN and Quantity. Accordingly, in this case hypothesis 2 is not rejected for 
TOI, meaning there is a positive association between the choice of a Big4 and a higher proclivity 
to provide higher incidence of environmental information in quantitative terms over the total 
environmental information disclosed also when limiting the scope of analysis to more material 
topics. 
In conclusion, this additional test provides confirmation for the relation between Assurance and 
Quantity and strengthen the evidence on the association between Big4 and type of information. 
All the results of the regressions performed with the robust command are included in the 
Appendix. 
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4.4 A comparison with prior findings 
This paragraph is aimed at comparing the results I have obtained with the findings of prior 
studies that have addressed the same topic. I will highlight to what extent the results of my 
analysis provide confirmation of previous findings and to what extent results I have obtained 
represent novel findings. 
The evidence obtained that companies with assurance report more information is in line with 
other studies which have addressed the same research question employing traditional measures 
of disclosure quantity (Moroney et al., 2009; Faisal et al., 2012). A different conclusion is 
emphasized when looking at type of information and managerial orientation as proxy of quality. 
In this case results are more in line with the evidence highlighted by Michelon et al. (2015) that 
found no relationship between assurance and any dimension of disclosure quality. Accordingly, 
my research provides also a confirmation of the fact that previous studies performing content 
analysis of sustainability reports have been more focused on disclosure quantity then on quality, 
with the exception of Michelon et al (2015) that specifically addressed this gap in the literature 
developing a framework more concerned with quality measures.  
Concerning hypothesis 2, the fact that I did not find any significant impact of having a Big4 
assuror on the quantity of information, is in line with the result of Moroney et al. (2009) which 
did not find a significant effect of the type of assuror on disclosure. Conversely, some novel 
findings concerning the role of Big4 can be inferred form my analysis looking at the type of 
information and at managerial orientation. This could be seen as an additional confirmation of 
the fact that previous researches have been more focused on quantity rather than quality. 
Although, it should be noticed a significant difference in the research methodology I have 
adopted and the one adopted by Moroney et al. (2009): I divided the group of assurors into Big4 
and non, while Moroney et al. (2009) divided between accountant and non, therefore, there is 
not a complete overlapping between these two classifications as there are accountant assurors 
which are not Big4.  
The table below proposes a summary of the results of the three main researches with which I 
have compared my results. The last column of the table summarizes whether these previous 
results have been confirmed by my analysis or whether I have reached different evidence. 
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Table 36: Comparison between the results of previous studies and the results of my analysis 
 
Also the inference on control variables included in the model could be reconciled with prior 
findings existent in the literature. The significant impact of the number of years since which a 
company started to issue CSR information is in line with the findings of Moroney et al. (2009) 
showing that the level of experience reached by a company over CSR reporting has a relation 
with environmental disclosure quality. The role played by company’s size in enhancing the 
amount of information disclosed is a confirmation of the idea that bigger companies disclose 
more information, which is already a well rooted argument in the literature. What my analysis 
shades a light on is the fact that, given this higher amount, bigger companies tend to provide a 
lower incidence of environmental information expressed in quantitative terms and of 
environmental information showing a committed approach over the total amount of 
environmental information disclosed. 
Finally, although the results show that companies operating in Power & Heat industry disclose 
more information than companies operating in Oil & Gas, this evidence is not confirmed when 
limiting the scope of analysis to material topics. Moreover, no significant difference has been 
detected in term of type of information and managerial orientation. Therefore, the two 
industries seem quite comparable in term of disclosure quality, which is consistent with the fact 
that literature has considered both as environmentally sensitive industries.  
 
Authors Results Comparison with my research
Moroney et al. (2009)
-Positive relation between 
assurance and environmental 
disclosure quality
- No difference depending 
whether assurance is provided 
by accountants or consultants
-Confirmed for disclosure 
Quantity but not for TOI and 
MAN
-A weak positive association 
with Big4 has been detected for 
TOI and MAN
Faisal et al. (2012)
- Firms with assurance 
statement provide higher 
quality of sustainability 
disclosure
-Confirmed for disclosure 
Quantity but not for TOI and 
MAN
Michelon et al. (2015)
-Assurance is not significantly 
associated with disclosure 
quality
-Confirmed for TOI and MAN
 
 
 
  
 
 
Conclusions and limitations 
This study addressed both theoretically and empirically the practice of assurance and, more in 
details, investigated the relationship between environmental disclosure quality and assurance 
practice in a sample of companies belonging to environmentally sensitive industries. I have 
measured environmental disclosure using a multidimensional framework in an attempt to 
overcome the idea that quantity of disclosure is a proxy for quality. Thus, in this study, 
disclosure quality is measured not only by the quantity of information disclosed but also by the 
type of information and by the managerial orientation which underline the information itself. 
This definition of quality is based on the idea that quantitative information matter more than 
qualitative ones relying on the motto “What gets measured gets managed”, and that information 
communicating concrete results and objectives showing a committed approach is more relevant 
than information showing a generic or boilerplate approach.   
My research demonstrated that nor the fact of having assurance nor who performed it are 
irrelevant when analysing environmental disclosure quality. Results allow to conclude with a 
certain confidence that companies using external assurance provider tend to disclose more 
environmental information. It seems also possible to infer that, among assured companies, those 
that are assured by a Big4 provide better quality of disclosure, both in term of type of 
information and of managerial orientation. However, more cautious conclusion should be 
drawn for this finding, since the relation is not strongly significant and, for managerial 
orientation, it is not confirmed when limiting the scope of analysis to more material topics. 
I have drawn on Legitimacy Theory to interpret the approach showed by companies in adopting 
the practice of assurance. According to Legitimacy Theory, the variety of practices adopted by 
companies to legitimize their activities “shade greyly from substantive to symbolic” (Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990, p.182). The evidence observed by my analysis concerning the practice of 
assurance is in line with that statement. On one side, the choice to use an external assurance 
provider is accompanied by a commitment to disclose more information, thus suggesting a 
substantive approach. On the other side, there is no commitment to disclose information of 
better quality, when we look at the type of information disclosed and the managerial orientation, 
which could be interpreted as a symbolic use of assurance practice.    
I decided to add a further investigation on the effect played by different types of assurance 
provider based on fact that, on one side, Big4 have been considered higher quality assurance 
provider (Simnett et al., 2009), while, on the other side, they have been criticized for taking 
 
 
advantage of their reputation to increase profit operating in a field where they have no 
legitimacy (Power, 1997). What emerge from my analysis is that the decision to purchase 
assurance service form a Big4 is accompanied by a tendency to disclose more environmental 
information of quantitative type over the total amount of environmental information and, to a 
lesser extent, more environmental information communicating objectives and results over the 
total amount of environmental information disclosed. 
My research allows also to detect other variables which play a significant role in determining 
environmental disclosure quality. Consistently with previous studies on voluntary disclosure, 
company size has a significant role in enhancing the quantity of information, but not the quality 
measured by the two other dimensions. Bigger companies, in fact, seem to disclose more 
information, but, given this total amount, the incidence of environmental information expressed 
in quantitative terms and of environmental information showing a committed approach over the 
total amount of environmental information disclosed tend to be lower. The choice of issuing a 
standalone report dedicated to sustainability topics rather than including them within the annual 
report is positively associated with the quantity of information. Additionally, my analysis 
demonstrates that environmental disclosure improves over time: companies reporting 
environmental information for longer period of time tends to provide better quality of 
environmental disclosure.  
Moreover, my research allows to make some inference on the different features of companies 
that make different choices concerning assurance practice. Companies that decide to assure 
their sustainability information tend to be bigger and more profitable. On average, companies 
that decide to assure have been disclosing environmental information for more years, and, 
among them, companies that chose a Big4 have been disclosing environmental information for 
more years than companies that chose a different assurance provider. In term of environmental 
performance, companies that chose to assure tend to score better than companies that did not, 
and companies that chose an assuror other than Big4, on average, have a better performance 
than companies choosing a Big4.  
Finally, my research provides confirmation of some evidences which are already well rooted in 
the literature, namely the evidence that GRI are the most widespread guidelines for 
sustainability reporting and the evidence that Big4 dominate the market of sustainability 
assurance. Moreover, the empirical findings of my research show that, in the majority of the 
cases, the Big4 that performed the assurance engagement is the same that performed the 
financial audit. 
 
 
This study is not without limitations. The main limit is the restricted sample of analysis which 
has been determined by two factors. First, restricting the analysis to two industries in a specific 
geographical area, limited the number of companies eligible to be included in the sample. 
Second, content analysis is a time-consuming research method, accordingly a trade-off had to 
be found between the need to have a significant sample of companies and the need to conduct 
the analysis within a reasonable amount of time. The second limitation is the level of 
subjectivity involved in performing the content analysis. This is a shared concern for all the 
studies relying on content analysis as research method. Specifically, in my analysis the main 
issues have been that deciding whether a certain information could be deemed relevant for a 
certain topic could involve a level of discretion. Additionally, if deciding whether an 
information is qualitative or quantitative is quite straightforward, the same does not hold for the 
managerial approach: defining whether a certain information is showing a committed or a 
boilerplate approach could sometimes require a certain dose of subjectivity. To deal with that 
issue, I have tried to be more objective as possible and to adopt a consistent criterion in all the 
document I have analysed.  
Some limits which are intrinsic in the boundaries of my research could also represent interesting 
insights for further analysis. A first area of improvement is the approach I used in addressing 
the concern of materiality. I tackled it by constructing disclosure indexes that consider only 
more material topics, based on the intuition that the number of companies reporting on a certain 
topic could be considered a proxy for materiality. However, I acknowledge that this is a rough 
approach to deal with the issue. Materiality, as defined by GRI, is linked with the usefulness of 
the information for the stakeholders, therefore a more significant assessment of materiality 
should have been conducted considering which information is deemed material for the 
stakeholders of a certain company. Therefore, a step forward comparing to my research, could 
be verifying whether the topics for which a higher number of companies is disclosing could 
also be considered more material by the stakeholders. 
Another possible area of improvement could be to retest the hypotheses using a slightly 
different version of the indexes. For example, an additional analysis could have been run 
calculating type of information and managerial orientation as absolute values instead of 
incidence. Specifically, type of information could have been calculated simply as the number 
of recording units containing environmental information expressed in quantitative terms instead 
of, as I did, the incidence of these latter over the total recording unit containing environmental 
information. Similarly, managerial orientation could have been calculated simply as the 
number of recording units that contain environmental information and showing a committed 
 
 
approach instead of the incidence of these latter over the total of the recording units containing 
environmental information. This solution could provide an additional approach in measuring 
environmental disclosure quality. An additional test measuring type of information and 
managerial orientation in such way could be used to reconcile the evidence gathered from my 
analysis in order to obtain a more comprehensive test of the two hypotheses.  
A further development of the research could also be to analyse the same companies over more 
years in order to investigate whether the decision to turn to an external assurance provider at a 
certain point in time has a relation with disclosure quality. Specifically, it could have been 
interesting to analyse whether the same company shows an enhanced disclosure quality since 
when it decided to turn to an external assuror. My analysis did not allow to make such inference 
as all the documents analysed were referring to the same year, however I believe this type of 
analysis could be an interesting step forward.  
Another aspect that I didn’t take into account but that I believe it would have been meaningful 
to investigate is the amount of money paid to the assurance provider. Since one of the main 
drawback of assurance practice mentioned in the literature is the cost, it would have been 
interesting to have information on the size of this fee. With that purpose, I tried to dig into the 
financial statement of each company looking for this information. However not all the 
companies, provided information on audit and related services fees, and even when this 
information is available, the financial statement does not provide such detailed information to 
allow to isolate the fee paid for sustainability assurance.  
Finally, I think a next avenue for research could be to extend a similar analysis to other 
dimensions of sustainability disclosure and to other industries. I have addressed the topic of 
environmental disclosure within environmentally sensitive industries, therefore, a 
complementary analysis could be to investigate disclosure of topics concerning social 
dimension within industries that faces greater social exposure (socially sensitive industries).  
Concerning the limitations inherent in the regression model, I acknowledge that my OLS model 
might suffer from endogeneity bias due to omitted variables. Consequently, my model does not 
intend to claim any direction of causality neither between Assurance and Quantity, nor between 
Big4 and any of the quality measures. Additionally, the potential presence of endogeneity in 
the model does not allow to get rid of the threat of reverse causality. A phenomenon which 
could by reasonable to expect, in fact, is that companies may decide to turn to an external 
assurance provider once they have reached a certain threshold in the quantity and/or quality of 
information they disclose. My research did not address this concern and further analysis would 
be necessary to deal with that issue. The only result that can be inferred from my model is that 
 
 
there is an association between the practice of external assurance and the quantity of 
information provided and an association between the choice of a Big4 as assurance provider 
and type of information and managerial orientation. Accordingly, all I can say is that, on 
average, firms with assurance over CRS information disclose more environmental information 
than firms without assurance. Among the companies with assurance, on average, the ones 
assured by a Big4 disclose more environmental information in quantitative terms and more 
environmental information showing a committed approach over the total environmental 
information they disclose comparing to companies that chose a different assurance provider.  
It should be born in mind that, when looking toward the end goal of sustainable development, 
both the quantity and quality of information provided is of relative importance. What matter 
more is the substance beyond this information. For example, it is of relative interest to know 
how many sentences a company wrote concerning the topic of emission and it is also of limited 
interest to know if it is providing commitments to reduce those emissions. What matters more 
is the amount of emission the company is releasing or the value of target the companies is 
posing for their reduction. I addressed the topic from the perspective and with the background 
of an accounting student. Therefore, my research did not make any attempt in judging the 
substance of the information provided with a focus on the environmental performance a 
company is achieving. However, I believed the analysis I have conducted focusing on reporting 
practice could have been of a certain relevance in any case. Moreover, reconciling this evidence 
on reporting practice and quality of disclosure with the choice of assurance could be an 
interesting research question since there is still an open debate concerning the relevance and 
the credibility of assurance.      
My analysis does not find a solution to the open debate on practice of assurance. My research 
is couched within this debate and is dealing with it from a field of analysis that the literature 
has started to investigate: the link between the choice of assurance and disclosure quality. 
However, this is only one perspective to perform a critical analysis of the assurance practice. 
All I can say is that, on average, companies that adopt assurance show a commitment to disclose 
more environmental information. However, this finding does not opt out the criticisms toward 
assurance practice which have been analysed in depth in the literature review. The fact that 
companies with assurance disclose more environmental information does not mean that they 
show a better stakeholder engagement, nor that we can get rid of the concern of managerial 
capture. My goal it has only been to investigate the relation between assurance and disclosure 
quality, analysing the evidence reported within a sample of selected companies. There is no 
 
 
presumption to give a value judgement on the practice of assurance, nor any attempt to conclude 
whether sustainability reports should or should not be audited.  
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Table 37: Final scores obtained by each company 
  
Companies Quantity
Type of 
information
Managerial 
orientation
A2A 15% 47% 48%
Acciona 37% 47% 45%
Acea 35% 34% 37%
Areva 8% 23% 21%
Centrica 2% 15% 15%
CEZ as 10% 3% 9%
Dong Energy 6% 11% 15%
Drax Power 12% 14% 17%
Eon 20% 21% 21%
EDF 42% 27% 36%
Edison 22% 59% 59%
EDP Energia De Portugal 20% 35% 34%
Engie 11% 38% 44%
Endesa 53% 44% 47%
Enea 6% 18% 26%
Enel 58% 51% 57%
Fortum 39% 21% 28%
Gas Natural Fenosa 27% 33% 43%
Iberdrola 44% 53% 65%
Linde 18% 20% 21%
MVV 8% 5% 7%
National Grid 14% 2% 3%
Red Electrica de espania 24% 41% 52%
RWE 40% 18% 24%
Scottish & Southern Energy 11% 21% 33%
Terna 37% 35% 28%
VESTAS WIND SYSTEMS 10% 29% 29%
Veolia environnement 3% 19% 19%
Verbund 12% 35% 37%
United Utilities 2% 4% 5%
Total 22% 12% 12%
Royal Dutch Shell 24% 20% 23%
BP 28% 29% 31%
ENI 24% 29% 31%
REPSOL 10% 21% 22%
STATOIL 16% 27% 28%
Galp Energia 5% 32% 32%
Gazprom 21% 36% 37%
OMV 17% 26% 31%
NESTE 10% 43% 43%
Lundin Petroleum 12% 19% 26%
Gamesa 37% 40% 43%
SBM Offshore 3% 13% 13%
Tullow Oil 6% 42% 42%
Amec Foster Wheeler 15% 12% 19%
TGS Nopec Geophysical 1% 0% 0%
Petrofac 6% 9% 13%
Hellenic Petrolemu 9% 26% 30%
Rubis 20% 11% 11%
SNAM Rete Gas 23% 45% 44%
Akastor 2% 18% 18%
CGG SA 7% 49% 48%
Enagas 18% 33% 34%
 
 
 
Table 38: Final scores obtained by each company on material topics 
 
Companies Quantity
Type of 
information
Managerial 
orientation
A2A 23% 90% 92%
Acciona 46% 67% 65%
Acea 41% 47% 53%
Areva 21% 63% 64%
Centrica 6% 45% 46%
CEZ as 17% 7% 19%
Dong Energy 13% 24% 29%
Drax Power 17% 24% 35%
Eon 29% 55% 55%
EDF 60% 52% 63%
Edison 27% 60% 60%
EDP Energia De Portugal 39% 63% 58%
Engie 20% 34% 49%
Endesa 80% 42% 43%
Enea 16% 41% 64%
Enel 60% 61% 65%
Fortum 73% 49% 50%
Gas Natural Fenosa 34% 51% 78%
Iberdrola 65% 44% 59%
Linde 46% 50% 51%
MVV 23% 13% 16%
National Grid 17% 5% 8%
Red Electrica de espania 39% 75% 76%
RWE 58% 34% 39%
Scottish & Southern Energy 17% 48% 55%
Terna 30% 30% 39%
VESTAS WIND SYSTEMS 19% 51% 66%
Veolia environnement 7% 31% 31%
Verbund 26% 57% 63%
United Utilities 5% 13% 14%
Total 29% 23% 22%
Royal Dutch Shell 41% 47% 52%
BP 52% 39% 47%
ENI 36% 53% 57%
REPSOL 22% 37% 42%
STATOIL 36% 56% 58%
Galp Energia 13% 70% 71%
Gazprom 39% 57% 60%
OMV 37% 53% 67%
NESTE 28% 78% 80%
Lundin Petroleum 21% 45% 47%
Gamesa 48% 67% 73%
SBM Offshore 9% 40% 40%
Tullow Oil 15% 100% 100%
Amec Foster Wheeler 42% 37% 58%
TGS Nopec Geophysical 2% 0% 0%
Petrofac 18% 28% 40%
Hellenic Petrolemu 22% 65% 78%
Rubis 51% 34% 33%
SNAM Rete Gas 44% 74% 78%
Akastor 5% 30% 30%
CGG SA 14% 71% 70%
Enagas 46% 60% 63%
 
 
 
Table 39: First regression for H1 with robust standard error 
 
 
 
Table 40: Second regression for H1 with robust standard error 
 
 
Table 41: Third regression for H1 with robust standard error 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept -0,48 -2,13 0,039
Assurance 0,11 2,38     0,022** 1,44
SR 0,07 2,39     0,021** 1,22
Size 0,02 1,96   0,056* 1,56
Lev 0,02 -0,19 0,851 1,01
Year 0,01 1,96     0,056** 1,69
ROA 0,36 -1,06 0,294 1,48
Environmental score 0,00 -0,58 0,564 1,50
Sector 0,07 2,42     0,020** 1,16
R² 47%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Quantity
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 0,71 1,99 0,053
Assurance 0,05 0,77 0,444 1,44
SR 0,02 0,50 0,621 1,22
Size -0,03 -1,73    0,090* 1,56
Lev -0,07 -0,62 0,536 1,01
Year 0,02 3,10      0,003*** 1,69
ROA 0,10 0,20 0,840 1,48
Environmental score 0,00 0,16 0,872 1,50
Sector 0,03 0,68 0,498 1,16
R² 31%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Type of information
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 0,61 1,61 0,115
Assurance 0,05 0,68 0,499 1,44
SR 0,04 0,90 0,374 1,22
Size -0,02 -1,27 0,212 1,56
Lev -0,06 -0,49 0,627 1,01
Year 0,02 2,58       0,013*** 1,69
ROA 0,07 0,13 0,898 1,48
Environmental score 0,00 -0,17 0,864 1,50
Sector 0,04 0,95 0,348 1,16
R² 26%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Managerial orientation
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
 
 
 
Table 42: First regression for H2 with robust standard error 
 
 
 
Table 43: Second regression for H2 with robust standard error 
 
 
 
Table 44: Third regression for H2 with robust standard error 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept -0,52 -1,91 0,065
Big4 0,06 1,64 0,110 1,59
SR 0,11 2,95       0,006*** 1,49
Size 0,02 1,69 0,100 1,45
Lev -0,08 -0,80 0,428 1,16
Years 0,01 1,11 0,274 1,92
ROA 0,03 0,07 0,944 1,38
Environmental score 0,00 0,14 0,892 1,52
Sector 0,09 2,75       0,010*** 1,31
R² 47%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Quantity
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 0,82 2,67 0,011
Big4 0,12 2,56     0,015** 1,59
SR 0,11 2,85       0,007*** 1,49
Size -0,04 -2,88       0,007*** 1,45
Lev -0,12 -1,23 0,227 1,16
Years 0,01 2,30   0,028* 1,92
ROA 0,99 2,66     0,012** 1,38
Environmental score 0,00 0,52 0,608 1,52
Sector 0,01 0,15 0,882 1,31
R² 49%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Type of information
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 0,75 2,31 0,027
Big4 0,11 2,43     0,021** 1,59
SR 0,13 3,08       0,004*** 1,49
Size -0,03 -2,23     0,032** 1,45
Lev -0,15 -1,42 0,164 1,16
Years 0,01 2,15     0,039** 1,92
ROA 0,99 2,44     0,020** 1,38
Environmental score 0,00 0,31 0,759 1,52
Sector 0,02 0,61 0,543 1,31
R² 45%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Managerial orientation
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
 
 
 
Table 45: First regression for H1 on material topics with robust standard error 
 
 
 
Table 46: Second regression for H1 on material topics with robust standard error 
 
 
 
Table 47: Third regression for H1 on material topics with robust standard error 
 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept -0,59 -2,19 0,034
Assurance 0,18 3,08       0,004*** 1,44
SR 0,06 1,53 0,132 1,22
Size 0,04 2,73       0,009*** 1,56
Lev -0,08 -0,66 0,514 1,01
Year 0,01 1,54 0,131 1,69
ROA -0,55 -1,18 0,245 1,48
Environmental score 0,00 -1,24 0,222 1,50
Sector 0,03 0,66 0,511 1,16
R² 44%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Quantity
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 1,21 3,07 0,004
Assurance 0,10 1,20 0,236 1,44
SR -0,05 -0,70 0,487 1,22
Size -0,04 -2,24     0,030** 1,56
Lev 0,01 0,05 0,963 1,01
Year 0,02 2,57      0,014** 1,69
ROA 0,06 0,09 0,925 1,48
Environmental score 0,00 -0,56 0,577 1,50
Sector -0,06 -1,12 0,268 1,16
R² 30%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Type of information
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 1,18 2,67 0,011
Assurance 0,08 0,93 0,358 1,44
SR -0,03 -0,41 0,682 1,22
Size -0,04 -1,84   0,073* 1,56
Lev -0,03 -0,14 0,888 1,01
Year 0,02 2,30     0,026** 1,69
ROA 0,16 0,23 0,818 1,48
Environmental score 0,00 -0,52 0,605 1,50
Sector -0,05 -0,81 0,421 1,16
R² 24%
Number of companies 53
Dependent variable: Managerial orientation
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
 
 
 
Table 48: First regression for H2 on material topics with robust standard error 
 
 
 
 
Table 49: Second regression for H2 on material topics with robust standard error 
 
 
 
Table 50: Third regression for H2 on material topics with robust standard error 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept -0,41 -1,18 0,247
Big4 0,02 0,25 0,806 1,59
SR 0,11 1,98   0,056* 1,49
Size 0,03 2,20    0,035** 1,45
Lev -0,21 -1,30 0,203 1,16
Years 0,01 1,42 0,164 1,92
ROA -1,15 -0,25 0,817 1,38
Environmental score -0,27 -0,99 0,327 1,52
Sector 0,04 0,87 0,392 1,31
R² 36%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Quantity
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 1,21 2,86       0,007***
Big4 0,12 1,73   0,093* 1,59
SR 0,05 0,67 0,506 1,49
Size -0,04 -2,34   0,052* 1,45
Lev -0,19 -1,06 0,298 1,16
Years 0,01 1,49 0,146 1,92
ROA 1,06 1,9   0,066* 1,38
Environmental score 0,00 0,18 0,859 1,52
Sector -0,07 -1,31 0,197 1,31
R² 29%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Type of information
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
Coefficient t-statistic p-value VIF
Intercept 1,14 2,32 0,027
Big4 0,11 1,57 0,126 1,59
SR 0,07 1,01 0,319 1,49
Size -0,04 -1,89   0,067* 1,45
Lev -0,24 -1,30 0,201 1,16
Years 0,01 1,29 0,205 1,92
ROA 1,10 1,87   0,070* 1,38
Environmental score 0,00 0,59 0,557 1,52
Sector -0,06 -1,06 0,295 1,31
R² 28%
Number of companies 43
Dependent variable: Managerial orientation
Statistical significance at level ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%)
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